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ABSTRACT 
 
THE US DEMAND FOR DEFENSE SPENDING: AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION FOR THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
TÜZÜN, Furkan 
M.Sc., Economics 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. A. Talha YALTA 
 
Based on Smith (1989)’s neoclassical framework, the US demand for defense spending as 
a share of GDP (defense burden) is estimated by employing a relatively newly developed 
method called Me-boot rolling windows analysis using quarterly BEA and SIPRI data for 
the Post-Cold War times. While institutional inertia plays an important role in determining 
the US defense burden in general, there is no conclusive result concerning the growth rate 
since positive, negative, and insignificant effects were all observed for different time 
periods. The US defense burden was found to be well correlated with the price ratio of 
defense goods to civilian goods during times of high military mobilization probably due 
to the increasing demand for defense goods. The price effect in Smith’s original theory 
that has been omitted in previous empirical studies due to data unavailability was, thus, 
confirmed. Both Russian and Chinese defense burdens were found to be important 
determinants of the US defense decisions after the 2nd millennium. However, since the 
implementation of the US new Asia-Pacific rebalance policy in 2012, no significant result 
was reported concerning the Russian threat while there was evidence towards a rising 
rivalry between the US and China in great extent. This, in turn, suggests that the US 
military policy follows its foreign policy closely in a very dynamic way. 
Keywords: Defense demand, the US, Russia, China 
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ÖZ 
ABD’NİN SAVUNMA HARCAMASI TALEBİ: SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI İÇİN 
AMPİRİK BİR ÇALIŞMA 
TÜZÜN, Furkan 
Master of Arts, Economics 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. A. Talha YALTA 
Bu çalışmada, Smith (1989)’in ortaya koyduğu neoklasik çerçevede, ABD savunma yükü 
talebi tahmin edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Veriler, BEA ve SIPRI’den elde edilmiş olup, tahmin 
yöntemi için nispeten yeni bir metot olan ME-boot kayan pencereler yöntemi 
kullanılmıştır. ABD’nin savunma harcamalarının GDP’deki payının (savunma yükü), 
kendi gecikmesi, ekonominin büyüme hızı, nispi savunma maliyeti, Rusya ve Çin 
savunma yükleri ile anlamlı bir ilişki içinde olduğu saptanmıştır. ABD savunma yükü 
talebinde kurumsal bürokratik durağanlığın büyük bir rol oynadığı görülmüş, farklı zaman 
aralıklarında saptanan pozitif, negatif ve anlamsız sonuçlardan dolayı büyümenin etkisi 
için kesin bir yargıya varılamayacağı belirtilmiştir. Savunma fiyatlarının sivil fiyatlara 
oranı, ABD savunma yükünün belirlenmesinde genel olarak pozitif bir etkiye sahipken, 
bu etkinin yüksek askeri hareketlilik dönemlerinde artış içinde olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. 
Smith’in orijinal teorisinde bulunan ve veri eksikliğinden dolayı geçmiş ampirik 
çalışmalara dâhil edilmemiş olan fiyat etkisi, bu çalışma sayesinde görülebilmiştir. 2000 
yılından itibaren Rusya ve Çin savunma yüklerinin, ABD askeri kararlarına olan pozitif 
etkisi tespit edilmiştir. Ne var ki ABD’nin 2012 yılında itibaren uygulamaya koyduğu yeni 
Asya-Pasifik denge politikası sonrası, günümüze Rusya’nın artık önemli bir tehdit 
olmaktan çıktığı, Çin’in ise askeri alanda ABD’nin yeni büyük rakibi olduğu tespit 
edilmiştir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Savunma Talebi, ABD, Rusya, Çin  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
To investigate the determinants of demand for defense spending, variety of models 
have been developed according to different theories about the decision-making 
mechanism of national defense that encompasses influence of economic, political, and 
military parameters (Nikolaidou, 2008). Using diverse methodological approaches, past 
empirical studies of demand for defense spending have focused on individual or group of 
countries such as NATO members or Asian states, where the US military figures were 
incorporated into models as explanatory variables. However, almost no study has been 
conducted to understand the demand for defense spending of a super power such as the 
United States (US) in Post-Cold War time frame. In the present study, determinants of the 
US defense spending  will be investigated for the Post-Cold War times using a relatively 
new method, called rolling windows ME-boot analysis developed by Vinod (2004, 2006) 
(Vinod & de-Lacalle, 2009). The theoretical approach will be based on Smith (1989)’s 
neoclassical perspective where demand for defense burden is determined by internal 
economic, political, and military factors as well as external ones such as defense spending 
of rivals and/or alliances (Na, 2009).  
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Aggregate defense spending of three great powers –the USA, China, and Russia 
combined was approximately equal to the rest of the global defense spending in the 
beginning of the 1990s. Although “pursuit of peace dividends” was observed after the 
Cold War, great powers’ defense spending has increased by around 54% compared to a 
39% increase in defense spending of the rest of the world from 1992 to 2016. Around 15% 
difference between these two figures hint that some military competition might have been 
in effect between the US, China, and Russia after the Cold War.  
Graph 1.1. Total defense spending of great powers compared to the rest of global defense spending 
(Constant 2015 prices, SIPRI) 
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After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), most NATO 
members including the US reduced their percentage of GDP devoted to national defense 
(defense burden) to pursue peace dividends with the newly-established Russian Republic 
(George & Sandler, 2018). The defense burdens of the US and Russia were 4.7% and 
4.9% respectively about the end of Cold War in 1993. Although both countries reduced 
their defense burdens for about a decade, they gradually increased their defense spending 
during the 21st century and their defense burdens again reached the same levels in 2010 
for the US and in 2015 for Russia, according to data relieved by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2016 (SIPRI Military Expenditure 
Database). Because both GDP and defense spending of China have risen throughout this 
time span, Chinese defense burden remained relatively stable around 2% since 1992.  
Graph 1.2. Defense burdens of the US, Russia, and China (SIPRI) 
However, China has gone under a military modernizations process in the last three 
decades that manifested itself in aggregate defense spending (Raska, 2014). As of 2016, 
total defense spending of China and the USA were M$ 515,431 and M$ 225,713 
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respectively in constant 2015 prices, according to SIPRI. In terms of aggregate defense 
spending, although there is still a big gap before China catches up with the US, the gap is 
closing in a significant pace. China has increased its defense spending by 693% from 1994 
to 2016, compared to 17% and 67% increases for the US and Russia respectively. China’s 
per capita military expenditure has also been growing rapidly (Furuoka et al, 2016). From 
1995 to 2011, per capita military expenditure had increased tenfold from US$10.4 to 
US$106.2 (World Bank 2013).  
Graph 1.3. Aggregate defense spending of the US, Russia, and China (Constant 2015 prices, SIPRI) 
Reasons for such increases might be rooted to conflicts developed in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Georgia, and Crimea where interest of the US have confronted with the ones of Russia in 
the 2000s. Also, there has been an American-led NATO military buildup in Europe and 
Middle East against the Russian aggression and the Syrian Regime respectively. Chinese 
belligerence in China Sea against the US-backed Taiwan and North Korea’s increased 
number of nuclear weapon tests have been also considered as political and military 
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incidents that support increased aggregate defense spending and defense burden of the US 
throughout the last three decades.  
In 2017, National Security Strategy Report (NSSR) issued under Trump administration 
openly addressed that “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and 
interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity”. Additionally, then US 
Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis, asserted that “great-power competition - not terrorism - 
is now the primary focus of U.S. national security” as of 2018 and suggested “to prepare 
the US military for a possible conflict with China and Russia” (Mattis unveils new strategy 
focused on Russia and China, takes Congress to task for budget impasse, Washington 
Post, January 19, 2018) (ABD'nin yeni ulusal savunma stratejisi: 'Öncelik terörizm değil 
güç rekabeti, BBC, January 19, 2018). 
The US, China, and Russia are permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) that hold veto power for any resolution offered in meetings. With this 
respect, records of UNSC meetings carry helpful information regarding political 
confrontations great powers involve in in the international arena. The Veto List of UNSC 
provides with records regarding the voting behavior of the states in meetings where a veto 
vote is cast along with favor, against, and abstained votes. The correlation matrix of the 
votes of the five veto states in total of 35 meetings where resolutions about important 
global incidents are submitted shows the conflicting political interest between the US, 
Russia, and China. While the US votes are correlated positively with the votes of the UK 
and France, the correlations of the US votes with Russia and China are -0.9 and -0.6 
respectively. 
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Figure 1.1. Correlation matrix of votes in UNSC vetoed meetings 
 
All in all, military data, political confrontations and official reports together hint that 
the world again show signs of, if not a global war, a developing global political and 
military crisis and therefore make it crucial to study and grasp the determinants of  the US 
demand for military spending as the biggest player in the game. The rest of the paper is 
arranged as such: 2. A review of great powers, 3. Literature review, 4. Adopted theory and 
model, 5. Data and Methodology, 6. Empirical Findings, and 7. Conclusion. 
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CHAPTER II 
A REVIEW OF GREAT POWERS 
2.1. UNSC 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) consists of representatives from 15 states 
including five permanent members - the USA, UK, France, Russia, and China 
(Membership and Election, UN website). The remaining ten non-permanent members are 
elected in the United Nations General Assembly for a two year term in accordance with 
the General Assembly resolution 1991 (XVIII) of 17 December, 1963 (Membership and 
Election, UN website). UNSC functions as a habitat where important worldwide disputes 
are discussed amongst member states to provide resolutions. UNSC has power to act on 
behalf of all members of the UN and, in some cases, can resort to imposing sanctions or 
even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security 
(Functions and Powers of the Security Council, UN Website). An example of this is the 
deployment of UN Protection Forces in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 
wars in Yugoslavia in 1992 (Ramcharan, 2011). Accordingly, all members of the UN are 
obliged to implement the decisions made by the Security Council as dictated by the UN 
Charter (Functions and Powers of the Security Council, UN Website).  
With all these rules, regulations and requirements, UNSC proves to be the most 
powerful entity regarding international peace and security. However, this power might not 
represent all world nations’ interest equally. UN Charter requires that “Decisions of the 
Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members 
including the concurring votes of the permanent members”, meaning simply that the USA, 
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UK, Russia, China, and France holds the veto power in the Council. This structure of 
UNSC translates into that no member of the Council is able to pass a statement, make a 
decision, or give authorization to a military/political intervention without consulting and 
complying with these five permanent member states. This situation, in fact, reduces the 
decision making process of the UNSC from 15 member states to only five and deteriorates 
the fundamentals of democracy. Even more than a decade ago, privilege of veto power 
was criticized “anachronistic” in the UN official reports: “We see no practical way of 
changing the existing members’ veto powers. Yet, as a whole the institution of the veto 
has an anachronistic character that is unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly 
democratic age and we would urge that its use be limited to matters where vital interests 
are genuinely at stake.” (Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, Secretary General of the UNSC, 2004) 
Although undemocratic, and controversial, this structure of UNSC also provides us 
with tangible information regarding the USA’s allies and adversaries worldwide, for the 
purpose of this study. 
By consulting to the meeting records and draft resolution details of UNSC, one can 
rightly infer that the most powerful international entity regarding global peace and security 
is mostly controlled for the interest of two main grouping among its member states: the 
USA, UK, France (frequently supported by non-permanent members) on the one side, 
Russia and China on the other side. With this regard, the Veto List of UNSC meetings 
displays us a general understanding of the political ambitions of the USA, Russia, China, 
and NATO members worldwide inferred from the information available in the meeting 
records and submitted draft resolutions of the UNSC. 
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Table 2.1. UNSC Veto Meetings – 1 
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Table 2.2. UNSC Veto Meetings – 2 
Table 2.3. UNSC Veto Meetings – 3 
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From 1994 to 2017, 35 meetings of the UNSC ended up with an impeded decision due 
to veto of some permanent members. While 19 out of 35 draft resolutions for different 
international disputes were vetoed by Russia or China, 16 of them vetoed by either the 
USA, UK, France or a combination of them. In none of the vetoed resolutions since 1994, 
did the USA and Russia prevail the same vote as Favor or Against except the one about 
Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca 
(URNG) in which both of them voted Favor, but it was still vetoed by an Against vote by 
China.  
It is also worth noting that Russia, along with the USA, had not Abstained from a vote 
except only one time, which concerned a decision for the United Nations Preventive 
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) to be employed in Macedonia-Yugoslavia conflict in 
1999 for an extended time period. Russia always pointed its objection directly and either 
Favored or remained Against a decision according to the US position in the voting. China 
positioned itself on Russia’s side most of the time, however it displayed a more timid 
behavior in the recent years. From 2014 on, China Abstained from the vote 6 times, not 
giving an open and direct support to Russia.  
While the USA, UK, France and other non-permanent members of NATO states moved 
together against Russia and China in the voting process most of the time, the USA is 
sometimes left alone and sometimes not given enough support by UK and France when it 
comes to decisions about Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Five out of 13 such meetings, in 
which resolutions are vetoed about Israel and Palestine case, the USA remained as the 
sole member to vote Against the decision and vetoed the resolutions alone. On the one 
hand, UK Abstained from the vote six times in Israeli-Palestinian conflict and did not 
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display its direct support to the USA in the vetoing, France, on the other side, did Favored 
12 out of 13 times and opposed the US in the decision making process of the same topic. 
Moreover, the US could only get enough support from the non-permanent NATO member 
states: While Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Greece, Canada, and Czech Republic always 
placed themselves in the opposing side of the US when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian 
topic, support of Norway, Denmark, Germany, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia only 
remained as Abstaining from the vote since 1994. What is inferred is that interests of 
NATO member states could divert from the ones of the USA time to time. Being aware 
of this, the US might not take the security decisions of NATO members guaranteed, even 
though they would be official allies under the same organization. This being said, Russian 
and Chinese adversary seems to be some unchanging ones for the USA since 1994. 
UNSC Veto List provides with a general understanding of the alliances and adversaries 
built on the international stage. To summarize, it is observed that while the USA and 
NATO member states act towards the same direction most of the time, Russia and China 
seems to form an alliance on the opposite side. This setting in general sets ground to this 
study as I am able to identify allies and adversaries of the USA with the help of 
information provided by UNSC meeting records and vetoed resolutions. 
2.2. The US 
The US stands out as the greatest military power with respect to its paramount defense 
expenditure and advanced military technology today. In 2016, the US allocated around 
$606 billion to defense, while the rest of the world excluding China and Russia spent 
approximately $ 1385 billion to defense, with constant 2015 prices according to SIPRI. 
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Moreover, this one half ratio in defense spending has been preserved almost always since 
the end of Cold-War. When Figure 2.1. is investigated, it is noteworthy to underscore that 
defense spending of the US and the rest of the world are in an increasing pattern since the 
beginning of the second millennium, which coincides with the US military intervention in 
Afghanistan as a response to 9/11 attacks . This coincidence that results with the radical 
increase in world defense spending signifies a crucial fundamental in defense economics 
literature. It is academically accepted that states around the world considers a rise in US 
defense spending as a signal for a regional and/or global uproar and adjust their defensive 
means accordingly. This brings the idea of the US being the Stackelberg leader in defense 
spending in the world (Bruce 1990) (Markowski et. al 2017), which gives states an 
opportunity to free-ride or follow the US as it is the case in Asian countries (George et al, 
2018). For this reason, while most of the recent demand for defense spending studies 
include the US defense spending as an explanatory variable in their models, little has been 
done to understand the defense behavior of the US itself except for a few within the 
literature of defense economics. 
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Graph 2.1. The US Military Expenditure Compared to China, Russia, and the Rest of the World for the 
1992-2016 period 
Excluding war time mobilization, Nincic and Cusack (1979) found out that the main 
determinants in defense spending dynamics were the anticipated utility of defense 
spending for aggregate demand stabilization, the political value of the anticipated 
economic effects due to defense spending, and the pressures arising from institutional-
constituency demands (Nincic & Cusack, 1979). Cusack & Don Ward (1981) conducted 
an empirical investigation regarding demand for defense expenditure of the US, Russia, 
and China for the Cold War times based on both Ricardson’s ams race model and domestic 
political economy model separately for the purpose of comparison and they reached the 
conclusion that there exist little evidence of an arms race among these three great powers. 
Based on domestic political economy model, they found out that change in defense 
spending of the US depends on electoral cycle, change in aggregate demand, change in 
military expenditure, and war mobilization (Cusack & Don Ward, 1981). On the contrary, 
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Don Ward (1984) validated the existence of an arms race between the US and the USSR 
employing a continuous time simulation model of the arms expenditure and stockpiles of 
two countries. He defended that great power states react to the stockpiles of weapons 
rather than aggregate defense spending of their perceived opponents and claimed that the 
action-reaction system might need around 3000 years to return to the steady state (Don 
Ward, 1984). Employing arms race model, Meanna (2004) employed methodologies of 
Johansen co-integration and error correction together with vector auto regression (VAR) 
technique, and found out that military spending and economic growth have neither a 
statistical nor an economic impact on each other for the US for the 1959-2001 time period 
(Meanna 2004). 
 Graph 2.2. US defense spending summary for 1992-2016 time period 
According to Professor Jules Dufour, there exist between 700-800 military facilities of 
the US in 63 countries and 255,065 US military personnel deployed Worldwide according 
to the data collected between 2001 and 2005 (The Worldwide Network of US Military 
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Bases, Global Research). Gelman (2007) examined 2005 official Pentagon data and found 
out that the US owns a total of 737 military facilities overseas. Also counting the military 
facilities within the boundaries of U.S., land area occupied by US military bases globally 
covers approximately 2,202,735 hectares in total, which deems the US Department of 
Defense one of the greatest landowners in the world (Gelman, J., 2007). According to the 
article published in POLITICO, the US possesses 800 military bases in more than 70 
countries and territories abroad, which cost $160 to $200 billion to the US government 
(Where in the World Is the U.S. Military?, POLITICO, July 2015). Currently, with 
incomparable defense force, the US owns an exclusive ability to act anywhere in the world 
with its military pursue US interests and to maintain “full spectrum dominance” (US 
Military Expansion and Intervention, Global Policy Forum) 
Map 2.1. US Military Facilities Around the Globe (Where in the World Is the U.S. Military?, POLITICO, 
July 2015) 
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2.3. NATO 
NATO’s founding treaty was signed in 1949 in Washington D.C. between 12 European 
and North American states to create a defense pact against Soviet Russia as Russia’s 
ambition of extending its control of Eastern Europe to other parts of the continent became 
immediate with the Berlin Blockade in 1948, and the 1948 Czechoslovak military coup 
organized by the Communists (NATO Encyclopedia, 2016). Not so surprisingly, NATO’s 
first Secretary General, Lord Ismay from United Kingdom, stated that a primary goal of 
the organization was to ‘keep the Americans in, the Russians out’ (Reynolds, 1994).  
From 1949 to 1967, NATO relied mostly on strategic nuclear weapons to avert Soviet 
expansion grounded on mutual assured destruction (MAD) doctrine, meaning that any 
territorial expansion of the USSR involving NATO member states would be retaliated 
with a nuclear attack by means of the nuclear arsenals of the US, the UK, and France 
(George & Sandler, 2018). This in turn supplied public benefits to allied countries under 
NATO (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966) by means of free-ride. 
Following Harmel Report issued in 1967, NATO adopted the doctrine of flexible 
response, whereby NATO would respond in a suitable way to the aggression of the 
Warsaw Pact (Future Tasks of The Alliance - Harmel Report, 1967). However, Murdoch 
and Sandler (1984) showed that flexible response was not effective until 1975, the year in 
which smaller NATO allies that did not have nuclear arsenal really started off building up 
conventional forces of themselves to defend their states against possible Soviet 
aggressions.  
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After the end of the Cold War that resulted with the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the 
reorganized Russian Federation did not pose danger to European states (George & 
Sandler, 2018), thus NATO continued its services in Bosnia and Kosovo by providing 
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (Gaibulloev et al, 2015). In accordance, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina operation during the four-year war period when Yugoslavia 
collapsed was NATO’s first operation undertaken as a major crises response (Peace 
Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Encyclopedia of NATO) 
Today, 29 independent states are active members of NATO with only the USA and 
Canada are from outside of the European continent. Even though the founding objective 
of NATO was to keep the Americans in and the Russians out, 13 member states including 
Poland and Czech Republic joined the organization after 1999. After 1999, number of 
NATO members grew by 75% when former members of the Warsaw Pact along with two 
portions of nonaligned Yugoslavia joined NATO (George & Sandler, 2018). Post-Soviet 
states like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, however, had not become a member of NATO 
up until 2004, 13 years after the breakup of the USSR. Yet, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine 
are states who had been established in Europe after the collapse of the USSR and have 
still not joined NATO till today (Member Countries, NATO website). This might show 
that although NATO contributed to form an alliance against Russia, Russian impact on 
the post-Soviet states has lasted more than a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and could also be observed today.   
As noted in The Independent on February 5, 2017, there are approximately 7200 troops 
consisting of soldiers and equipment from the USA, UK, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Denmark, Norway, Poland, Albania, Slovenia, Croatia, Netherlands, and 
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Luxemburg across the Western border of Russia. Troops are spread across Russia’s 
western border in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria with the 
support of the local militaries. The largest battalion got located in early 2017 in Poland 
and led by US with 4000 US troops and 250 tanks. Also, 300 US marine soldiers are on 
service in Norway sharing border with Russia in the Arctic Circle. The NATO build-up 
across Russian border is part of a mission, called Operation Atlantic Resolve, and created 
to exhibit to Russia the commitment of the US to defend its NATO allies (The map that 
shows how many NATO troops are deployed along Russia’s border, The Independent, 
February 5, 2017). Russian officials claim that this is the largest military build-up since 
the World War II (US Troops Deployed to Poland in Response to Russian Aggression. 
The Independent, January 9, 2017).  
Although it is seems unfair that the USA shoulders most of the defense burden amongst 
NATO members with approximately two-third of the total defense spending of NATO 
(Military Spending by NATO Members, February 16, 2017, The Economist) it cannot be 
denied that the USA could not be able to encircle Russian western border without the 
geographical support of the other member states. With this regard, while NATO 
Declaration after the Wales Summit in 2014 guides all member states to achieve a defense 
budget equivalent to 2% of their GDP in real terms, the same level of defense burden 
might still not be a fair contribution to the organization, taking into account the important 
geo-political location of some states like Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania bordering 
Russia. Given that Belarus and Ukraine - other passages to Russia – are not NATO 
members, only the pure value of the strategic location of these four member states might 
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exceed any other contribution to the organization since the very existence of NATO is to 
fight against Russian influence in parts of Europe.  
Map 2.2. NATO’s Military Build-up in Eastern Europe (The map that shows how many Nato troops are 
deployed along Russia’s border, The Independent, February 5, 2017 
 
Spangler (2017) investigated the US effects on European demand for military 
expenditure using Arellano and Bond method (1991) and found out that a 10% increase 
in total US defense spending would result in a 3.6% fall in defense spending in Europe. 
This shows a substitution effect between military expenditures of US and European states, 
which mostly consist of NATO members in his study. According to his findings, European 
states might not include number of US military personnel and bases located in the 
continent in their security considerations, but they do react to threats Russia poses 
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regionally. An approximately 60% average increase in real military expenditures of the 
Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – from 2013 to 2016 might be an evidence 
towards Spangler’s this finding since annexation of Crimea by Russia could be taken as a 
significant threat to small countries bordering Russia (Poland Welcomes Thousands of 
US Troops in NATO Show of Force, CNN, January 14, 2017).  
After the 9/11 tragedy happened in 2001 in the US, NATO took part in combating Al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan as its longest and most arduous operation until today with troops 
from NATO and partner states that exceeded 130,000 soldiers in total. NATO led the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) between August 2003 and December 2014 
and conducted security operations in order to help the Afghan nation building up their 
security forces (NATO and Afghanistan, Encyclopedia of NATO). Although ISAF 
operation ended, NATO launched, in 2015, a new non-combat Resolute Support Mission 
(RSM) to train, advice and assist Afghan security forces/institutions. As of November 
2017, military contributors of the alliance confirmed that RSM troops will be increased 
from about 13,000 to approximately 16,000 soldiers (NATO and Afghanistan, 
Encyclopedia of NATO). 
Concerning the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO leaders condemned 
military intervention of Russia in Ukraine and demanded from Russia to withdraw its 
forces from Ukraine at the NATO Summit in Wales in the same year. However, because 
Ukraine is not a NATO member, Article 5 of the organization’s founding treaty, which 
follows “an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies” did not 
apply. Instead of direct military intervention, NATO decided to support Ukraine 
politically by halting all civilian and military cooperation with Russia. After the Wales 
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Summit, “five trust funds were set up in critical areas of reform and capability 
development of the Ukrainian security and defense sector, including command, control, 
communications and computers; logistics and standardization; cyber defense; military 
career transition; and medical rehabilitation. A sixth Trust Fund on explosive ordnance 
disposal/counter-improvised explosive devices followed in 2016” (Relations with 
Ukraine, NATO web site). 
With regards to the Syrian war, NATO deployed defensive missile systems across 
southern border of Turkey to protect the population and territory of a member country 
against ballistic missile threats from the Syrian crisis in 2012. At the end of 2015, NATO 
agreed to reinforce support to Turkey in the form of enhanced air patrols, increased 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and a stronger naval presence in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. 
 
2.4. RUSSIA 
Dissolution of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 resulted with the 
birth of 15 independent states of which Russian Federation became the successor country 
of the USSR and inherited the UN Security Council permanent membership. Under 
different intergovernmental organizations, Russia as the primary mover maintained its 
political, economic, and military influences on these newly independent states. The list of 
such organizations are listed below: 
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Map 2.3. Post-Soviet States and Disputed Areas (Post-Soviet world: what you need to know about the 15 
states, The Guardian)  
1. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): Founded on 8 December 1991. 
Aimed at coordination in the areas of trade, finance, lawmaking, security, and cross-border 
crime prevention. Member states are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. While Turkmenistan joined the CIS 
in the 1993 expansion of the organization, it only remained as an associate state rather 
than a fully member state today. As one of the founding states of the CIS, Ukraine 
withdrew from the organization on 19 May, 2018 due to Russian annexation of Crimea. 
Also Georgia withdrew from the CIS on 18 August, 2008 due to Russo-Georgia War that 
took place in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  
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2. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO): A military alliance that was 
signed by six post-Soviet states belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
on 15 May 1992. Although some other post-Soviet states have joined and left the 
organization, today, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
participate as the member states. Afghanistan and Serbia are non-member observer states 
within the organization. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan are also former member 
states that withdrew from the alliance in 1999. The CSTO gives veto right to Russia for 
the establishment of new foreign military bases in the member states (CSTO tightens 
foreign base norms, The Hindu, December 22, 2011) , allows all members to purchase 
Russian weapons at the same price as Russia (Gendarme of Eurasia, Kommersant, October 
8, 2007), and handles joint military exercises such as the one that took place in August 
2014, with 3,000 soldiers from the members of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan participated in psychological and cyber warfare 
exercises in Kazakhstan (Russia Engages in Military Drills on Europe’s Doorstep, The 
Diplomat, August 25, 2015).  
3. Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area (CISFTA): A free trade zone 
was sought since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, but an agreement could be 
reached after two decades. On 18 October 2011, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Moldova and Armenia signed the FTA agreement (CIS leaders 
sign free trade deal, Sputnik, October 18, 2011). Today, participating nine member states 
of the CISFTA are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan stands as the only state who is a member 
of the CIS and still not a member of the CISFTA. 
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4. Union State of Russia and Belarus (Union State): Although several other treaties were 
signed for strengthening of the relations between Russia and Belarus since 1996, The 
Treaty on the Creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus was signed on 8 December 
1999 (Russia and Belarus form confederation, BBC News, December 8, 1999). Apart from 
aiming for creating a Soviet Union-like federation, with a shared state head, , national 
constitution, citizenship right, anthem, currency and defense force, most important 
international effect of the Union lies in Russia’s military doctrine, which affirms that "an 
armed attack on the state-participant in the Union State, as well as all other actions 
involving the use of military force against it," should be considered as "an act of 
aggression against the Union State", giving right to Russia to "take measures in response" 
at the northeastern gate of Europe. Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Ukraine, Novorossiya, and Transnistria have shown interest to join the Union 
State at different occasions (Теміргалієв оголосив про швидке створення "Української 
Федерації", Ukrainian Truth, 16 April, 2014) (Basora & Fisher, 2014) (East Ukraine 
separatists seek union with Russia, BBC News, May 12,2 014) (Transnistria or Moldovian 
Transnistrian Republic: Just Facts, Moldova.org, December 20, 2008) (Belarus to 
consider recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Abkhaz World, November 5, 2009) 
(Moldova ready for Russia Belarus union, BBC News, April 17, 2001) (Järve, 2001). 
Considering the political and military conflicts happening in these states and autonomous 
regions together with the Soviet military doctrine, which mirrors the NATO’s Article 5, 
Russia could penetrate politically, militarily, and most importantly formally towards the 
insides of Europe and the middle Asia if the Union is to be extended.  
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5. Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU): EAEU treaty was signed on 29 May 2014 by 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, followed by Armenia’s and Kyrgyzstan's accessions in 
October and December 2014 respectively. The EAEU has an integrated single market of 
183 million people and a gross domestic product of over 4 trillion U.S. dollars (PPP) 
according to World Bank data. It is claimed that Putin aims at growing the EAEU into a 
"powerful, supra-national union" of sovereign states like the EU, uniting economies, legal 
systems, customs services, and military capabilities to form a bridge between Europe and 
Asia to balance the EU and the U.S (A brief primer on Vladimir Putin's Eurasian dream, 
The Guardian, February 18, 2014). Memberships of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, Transnistria, Donetsk, Luhanks, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia 
have also been discussed. Moreover, the EAEU reached FTA agreements with nine non-
union states, namely Ukraine, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Tajikistan, Vietnam, China, 
Iran, and Serbia.  
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Figure 2.2. Supranational organizations formed by post-Soviet states 
 
Apart from Russia’s attempt to politically, economically, and militarily influence the 
post-Soviet states through these supranational organizations allows it to have a say in any 
conflict occurring in Europe, Caucasus, and the Balkans. The Russian support to the 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and the Russian 
annexation of Crimea in 2014 are nice examples of such power within the proximate 
region of Russia. However, Russia has also kept serious partnerships with other world 
states against the NATO pact and the US to have a seat in the global power structure. Most 
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important initiatives to this end are the foundation of the BRICS, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
1. BRICS: Founded in 2009 and today consists of China, Brazil, Russia, India and South 
Africa. BRICS is an important organization that hold significant economic power globally 
with its members coming from America, Europe, Africa, and Asia. Altogether, “they 
account for 26.46% of world land area, 42.58% of world population, 13.24% of World 
Bank voting power and 14.91% of IMF quota shares” (What is BRICS, BRICS 2017 web 
site). According to IMF’s estimates, BRICS countries generated 22.53% of the world GDP 
in 2015 and has contributed more than 50% of world economic growth during the last 10 
years. BRICS countries have been working on common goals together towards “certain 
regional problems, including the Libyan, Syrian and Afghan problems and the Iranian 
nuclear programme”. “They have also had common agreement on financial and economic 
issues, including World Bank and IMF reforms, measures to ensure that sufficient 
resources can be mobilized to the IMF to strengthen its anti-crisis potential, the creation 
of BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism which provides for Extending Credit 
Facility in Local Currency and the establishment of the BRICS Exchanges Alliance” 
(History of BRICS, www.infobrics.org). When considering that the BRICS countries are 
important members of regional supranational organizations such as the SCO, the APEC, 
the Union of South American Nations (USAN), the MERCOSUR, the Community of 
Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the African Union (AU), the South 
Africa Development Community (SADC), and the South Asian Association of Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC), the BRICS influence could be interpreted to reach 114 separate 
states worldwide.  
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2. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): A permanent intergovernmental 
organization created by Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Tajikistan in 2001. Today, there are eight members of the organization including India 
and Pakistan. As stated in their official website, among the goals of the organization are 
“…making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region; 
and moving towards the establishment of a democratic, fair and rational new international 
political and economic order” (About SCO, official website). 
3. The Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): Founded in 1989 by the efforts of 
then Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke as a response to the growing interdependence 
of the Asia-Pacific economies (Elek, 2005). Today, there are 21 members participating 
under APEC including the USA, Russia, and China. A comprehensive Free Trade Area of 
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) agreement has been discussed since the beginning of the APEC, 
however it is expected to take many years involving essential studies, evaluations and 
negotiations between member economies (Brilliant, 2007). Under APEC Study Centers 
Consortium established in 1993, there are more than APEC Study Centers (ASC) 
operating in member states for the purpose of advancing research and collaboration 
regarding APEC related issues (APEC Study Centers Consortium, Official website of 
APEC).  
While Russia plays proactive roles under different supra-governmental and 
intergovernmental organizations for political and economic aspirations regional and 
global wise, its defensive potential and military involvements around the World has also 
been increasing since the 1990s that could would found a serious basis to these very 
political and economic ends. 
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According to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Russia owns 
nine military bases abroad in the countries Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Syria. Counting the naval resupply bases 
in Vietnam, naval facility in Syrian Tartus and Russian Black Sea Fleet located in Crimean 
Sevastopol increases the number to a total of 12 Russian military base abroad, compared 
to 35 abroad military bases of the US all around the world (Klein, 2009) (Where are US 
and Russian Military Bases in the World?, Radio Free Europe) (Russian Military Bases 
Abroad: How Many and Where?, Sputnik, December 19, 2015) (What Should the United 
States Do about Cam Ranh Bay and Russia’s Place in Vietnam?, CogitAsia, Marc 16, 
2015). 
Russia has carried out several military interventions within the vicinity of its borders 
in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East since its foundation in 1991. Russia had 
militarily taken action in the regions Moldavian Transnistria, Chechnya, Dagestan, 
Abkhazia and Ossetia regions of Georgia, Crimean region of Ukraine, and Syria up to day. 
In the Russo-Georgian War taken place in 2008, Russia sent its military support to the 
people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia against the Georgian state that resulted with 
Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent republics. Russia, 
today, de facto occupies some 17 per cent of the country and half its Black Sea coastline 
(Besemeres, 2016). In 2014, Ukrainian pro-Russian separatists had also received military 
support of Russia against the government of Ukraine that resulted with the absorption of 
Crimea into Russia, which Ukrainian officials describe as an annexation (Post-Soviet 
Russian military interventions, NOW, October 21, 2015). After the annexation of the 
Crimea, Transnistria, a Russian-supported enclave in mainly Romanian-speaking 
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Moldova, which shares no common border with Russia, has also indicated its wish to be 
annexed. Analysts suggest that territorial demands of Russia is not to be over and Russia 
is expected to be afoot for Moldova (Besemeres, 2016) and Baltic states (Suslov, 2016). 
According to some academicians, Russia’s Crimea move also underscored the end of Post-
Cold War period (Suslov, 2016). Columbia University Professor Robert Legvold claims 
that: 
“The crisis in Ukraine has pushed the two sides over a cliff and into a new relationship, one not 
softened by the ambiguity that defined the last decade of the post–Cold War period …Russia and the West 
are now adversaries.” 
Most notable Russian military intervention has begun in 2015 in the Syrian territory 
after an official request by the Syrian government for military aid to support Syrian 
government against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the local rebellious 
groups that demand Syrian president Bashar al-Assad (Russia carries out first air strikes 
in Syria, Al-Jazeera, September 30, 2015). Russia’s direct military intervention marked 
the first time since the end of the Cold War that Russia entered an armed conflict outside 
the borders of the former Soviet Union (Ghost soldiers: the Russians secretly dying for 
the Kremlin in Syria, Reuters, November 3, 2016). Russia has a naval facility in the 
northwestern Syria bordered to the Mediterranean Sea and it has been used for supplies of 
Russian armaments and military cargo since June 2012, according to TASS (The point of 
material and technical support of the Russian Navy in Tartus, TASS, December 13, 2017) 
(Clashes between Syrian troops, insurgents intensify in Russian-backed offensive, US 
News, October 8, 2015). Russia has increased its existence when the Syrian civil war 
emerged and today stands as an important political and military player in the region. The 
Astana Talks initiated by Russia, Turkey and Iran in December 2016 proved to be a more 
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productive space than US-led Geneva Talks with at least some results towards peace 
reached such as a nationwide ceasefire in Syria happened in 2016, and the creation of de-
escalation zones in Idlib, Latakia, Homs, Ghouta, and along the Jodan-Syria border 
(Russia, Turkey and Iran continue cooperation on de-escalation zones in Syria, TASS, 
June 23, 2017) (Kazakhstan welcomes results of Syria meeting in Astana, as Russia, Iran 
and Turkey issue joint statement, The Astana Times, March 17, 2017). Many including 
the US Senator John McCain had interpreted the Syrian civil war as a proxy war between 
the US and Russia (Shapiro & Estrin, 2014). The New York Times October 12, 2015) 
(John McCain says US is engaged in proxy war with Russia in Syria. The Guardian, 
October 4, 2015) (Bremmer, 2018).  
The political attempts and military involvements of Russia within the borders pf the 
former Soviet Union is also ideologically supported by the “Russian World” concept 
(Suslov, 2018). President Putin of Russia explained at the First World Congress of Russian 
Compatriots in 2001 that the “Russian world” had always gone beyond the formal borders 
of Russia as a state because millions of people “who speak, think and – what is perhaps 
most important – feel in Russian” live outside of Russia, but maintain close ties with it 
(Putin, 2001).  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, most NATO states including the US reduced 
their percentage of GDP devoted to national defense (defense burden) to pursue peace 
dividends with newly-established Russian Republic (George & Sandler, 2018). The 
defense burdens of the US and Russia were 4.7% and 4.9% respectively about the end of 
Cold War in 1993. Although both countries reduced their defense burdens for about a 
decade, they gradually increased their defense spending during the 21st century and their 
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defense burdens again reached the same levels in 2010 for the US and in 2015 for Russia, 
according to data relieved by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) in 2016. Although Russian percentage of GDP devoted to military expenditure 
have reached 5%, government expenditure canalized to defense spending have increased 
from 7% in 1998 to approximately 16% in 2016. To put it in a comparative perspective, 
the US share of government expenditure devoted to defense was 9.3% in 2016, while it 
reached its maximum level with 11.8% in 2011. This might show that the Russian political 
intentions to influence the nations alongside its borders and in the Middle East against the 
US-NATO pact has also been strongly supported by military means. Percentage increase 
of aggregate defense spending of Russia is also around fourfold that of the US one from 
1992 to 2016. While Russian defense spending rose around 68%, the US defense spending 
only rose by 18% for the Post-Cold War times. From a study of the Russian federal budget 
share of defense, Oxenstierna (2016) maintains that “defense still has high priority in 
terms of a rising share of Russian GDP”. Yet, she found out that “there is still a trade-off 
between defense and other spending in the budget such as health services, support to the 
economy and environmental protection” (Oxenstierna 2016). Still, Russian President Putin 
has recently signed a State Armaments Programme, which will allocate approximately 
$357 billion to defense for the 2018-2027 period (Putin signs new State Armaments 
Programme, Jane’s 360, February 28, 2018). The new state armament program will focus 
on areas neglected, or perhaps ‘jump started’ by its predecessor including large-scale 
acquisition of precision guided munitions, long-range standoff cruise missiles, transport 
aviation, bomber modernization, expansion of artillery, armor, and missile formations in 
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the ground forces, more capable drones, and next generation tech like hypersonic weapons 
(Kofman, 2018). 
Graph 2.3. Russian defense spending summary for the 1992-2016 time period 
Although the rate of increase in defense figures of Russia are much more than that of 
the US counterparts for the Post-Cold War times, still Russia is far from reaching the US 
in terms of aggregate defense spending. As of 2016, while defense spending of the US 
was approximately $606 billion, Russia’s total spending on national defense remained 
only around $70 billion with constant 2015 prices according to SIPRI data. This huge gap 
in total defense spending shows that although Russia has invested in political and 
economic organizations since its foundation and heavily involved in military conflicts 
along/around its borders, it could only be described as a regional power compared to the 
globally hegemonic power of the US. However, regional power can quake the 
international order and deteriorate the status and claim of the US as the leader in global 
security. According to Suslov (2016), Russian political and military interferences 
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including the one during the annexation of Ukrainian Crimea created a precedent of the 
US inability to prevent or turn back a serious violation of the established world order by 
a ‘regional power’. He maintains that: 
“This presents a challenge to the US’ possibility not just to play a role of the global leader, but also 
even to claim it. Indeed, if the self-proclaimed leader and guarantor of international security is not able to 
prevent violation of sovereignty of the largest European country and an important ‘strategic partner’ by a 
state, which is claimed to aspire for regional dominance, can it guarantee security of its allies and other 
partners?” 
Not surprisingly, the National Security Strategy Report issued in 2017 under Trump 
administration talks about Russia as a state who is “seeking to restore its great power 
status”, “aiming to weaken the US influence in the world”, and “creating an unstable 
frontier in Eurasia”. 
 
2.5. CHINA 
Michael Raska (2014) states that China has gone under four steps of defense 
modernization:  
1. The Maoist Era (1949-1976): Dependence on Soviet assistance. Defense sector at the 
center of the economy. 
2. Deng’s Demilitarization Era (1980s-1990s): No longer face Cold War threats. 
Defense industry pursue development of dual-use technologies applicable in both civilian 
and military needs. 
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3. Reform Era (1998-2012): Inefficient production due to overstaffing, bureaucracy, lack 
of cooperation. Reforms made to overcome these inefficiencies based on market-based 
mechanisms, increased industrial consolidation, and improved R&D resource allocation. 
4. Xi Jingping’s current Reform Era 2.0 (2012-present): Emphasis on R&D, 
advancement and expansion of the domestically produced weapons, enhancing military 
product export.  
Lori Robinson, General of The United States Air Force, states that ‘the technology gap 
certainly is closing, there is no denying that …’ In a report issued by Pentagon in 2015 
also argued that accelerated military modernization of China ‘has the potential to reduce 
core US military technological advantages’ (Mathieson, 2016). If both parties continue to 
increase these figures with the same speed, China will catch up with the USA in less than 
three decades (The Diplomat, March 7, 2013). And if Robertson and Sin’s study is taken 
into account, Chinese catch up would actually happen even in a closer time period. 
With its rising economic power and changes in defense policies, twenty-first century 
China is different from the China of the past such that it is way more effective, decisive, 
and willing to take action. One can interpret this shift as that China has experienced a 
transition from operating on defensive realism to the offensive form of it (Basu & 
Rakhahari 2016). Defensive realism dictates that states aspire for power solely for self-
preservation. Offensive realism, however, teaches that nations strive for power in order to 
“project” it.  
As of 2016, total defense spending of the US and China were M$ 606,232and M$ 
225,712 respectively in constant 2015 prices, according to SIPRI. Although there is still a 
big gap before China catches up with the US in terms of aggregate defense spending, the 
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gap is closing in a significant pace. China has increased its defense spending by 8,5 times 
from 1994 to 2016, compared to a 1,2 times increase of the US for the same period. 
Robertson and Sin (2017) also argued that real defense expenditure of China is in fact 
much greater than computed using exchange rates, and yet greater than computed by PPP 
rates. By creating a relative military cost price (MCR) index, they found out that Chinese 
real military spending is 39% and 42% of the US aggregate defense expenditure in 2010 
when Törnqvist and Fisher indices are used, respectively. This is an interesting result 
considering that than standard estimates range from 18% (with market exchange rates) to 
33% (with purchasing power parity rates). 
Graph 2.4. Chinese defense spending summary for 1992-2016 time period  
China’s per capita military expenditure is also growing rapidly (Furuoka et al, 2016). 
From 1989 to 2011, tenfold. From 1995 to 2011, per capita military expenditure had 
increased tenfold from US$10.4 to US$106.2 (World Bank 2013). 
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Upon the changing pattern of Chinese economy and defense decisions in the last 30 
years, the US take on China has also been changed. The traditional National Security 
Strategy Reports (NSSR) of the US administration hints us this change. A brief summary 
of these reports regarding the US perception on China is provided below: 
1993-2001, Bill Clinton (7 reports):  
1. Mostly a friendly tone. 
2. Goals of limitation of production, transfer and sale of Chinese weapons.  
3. Attempts to connect China with market economies via UN and WTO.  
4. Most aggressive word to describe China “authoritative, repressive”.  
5. China is stated as a “possible” “threat” only in 2001 report. China’s increasing 
defense spending and concerns over People’s Liberation Army started to be 
addressed in 2001.  
 
2001-2009, George Bush (2 reports): 
1. Not very friendly tone. 
2. Regional threat due to China’s increased military capacity is addressed. 
3. Criticizes China’s political path against democratic rule. 
4. Warns of the old pattern of great power competition. 
5. Addresses China’s need to complete WTO commitments. 
6. Concerns over non-transparency in military expansion of China 
7. Accuses China over “locking-up” energy resources around the globe. 
8. Accuses China over “supporting” some nations without considering the domestic 
misrule or overseas misbehavior. 
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9. Indirectly threatens China: “Our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the 
right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities.” 
2009-2017, Barack Obama (2 reports): 
1. Declares that the US monitors Chinese defense modernization. 
2. Declares that the US prepares accordingly to guarantee that U.S. regional and 
global interests along with its allies are not affected in a negative way. 
3. Maritime security in China Sea is addressed. 
4. Declares that the US takes necessary measures against private agents and the 
Chinese government for cyber-theft of trade secrets. 
 
2017- , Donald Trump (1 report): 
1. Addresses openly that China challenges American power. 
2. Many allegations with very aggressive tone.  
3. “China … developing advanced weapons and capabilities that could threaten our 
critical infrastructure and our command and control architecture.” 
4.  “…Chinese fentanyl traffickers, kills tens of thousands of Americans each year.” 
5. “Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S. intellectual property valued at 
hundreds of billions of dollars.” 
6. “China … want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests.” 
7. “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.” 
8. “Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the 
sovereignty of others. China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and 
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spreads features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and the use of 
surveillance.”  
9. “It is building the most capable and well-funded military in the world, after our 
own. Its nuclear arsenal is growing and diversifying. Part of China’s military 
modernization and economic expansion is due to its access to the U.S. innovation 
economy, including America’s world-class universities.” 
10. “China … target their investments in the developing world to expand influence 
and gain competitive advantages against the United States.” 
11. “China and Russia aspire to project power worldwide…” 
12. “Its efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the 
free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine 
regional stability. China has mounted a rapid military modernization campaign 
designed to limit U.S. access to the region.”  
13. Countries along the region are collectively asking for the U.S. leadership that 
promises a regional structure, which respects independence and sovereignty. 
14. China is exploiting penalties and economic inducements along with military 
threats to influence nations to follow its agenda of security and politics.  
Bill Clinton administration conceived China as an important ‘emerging market’ and as 
a possible important player in a globalizing world economy. At the same time, the Taiwan 
Strait crisis emerged around 1995 and 1996 proved that omitting strategic interests of 
China and failing to sustain healthy dialogue politically and militarily had the possibility 
of an unwanted crisis or a military issue. These concerns prompted Clinton 
administration’s efforts to escalate dialogue with the PLA and ultimately to express the 
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desire of constructing a productive strategic partnership with Chinese counterparts 
(Saunders & Bowie, 2016). Therefore, the USA was more open to dialogue and 
cooperation with China throughout almost a decade after the Cold War. The US tried to 
integrate China into the global hegemony via the UN and into the market economy via the 
WTO while securing itself with regional allies in the Asia-Pacific. Professor Joseph Nye 
of Harvard University, a strategist under Clinton administration, has defended that the 
Clinton administration aimed to “integrate” China into the World Trade Organization and 
other assemblies of the world while “hedging” through close US security cooperation with 
Japan (Nye, 2013) (Sutter et al, 2013). In accordance, American and Chinese then 
presidents, Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin, exchanged historical visits and even declared 
the mutual decision that neither countries will direct their nuclear weapons to each other. 
Issues and concerns about Taiwan, maritime conflicts, cyber security, military, democracy 
were stated vaguely in the NSSRs issued during Clinton administration. Only, in Clinton’s 
last year in the White House in 2001, worries over China’s increased military spending 
and PLA activities were directly addressed in the NSSR for the first time.  
When George W. Bush administration ascended to the office, it was considerably 
skeptical towards China and promised to approach China as a strategic competitor rather 
than a strategic partner (Saunders & Bowie, 2016). Accordingly, the US took over a more 
unfriendly tone regarding China in the two separate NSSRs issued during George Bush 
administration. The US started accusing China openly over locking-up energy supplies 
worldwide. While realization of China as a “regional threat” entered into reports, China is 
indirectly warned by saying “Our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right 
strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities.” 
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To cope with challenges put forward regionally and globally, Obama Administration 
allotted serious efforts to broaden and deepen the relationship between the US and China, 
citing the goal of building a new era of cooperation with emerging Asian powers, 
including China and India. The Obama administration has declared some announcements 
starting in 2011 fall, and taken steps to bolster up and enhance the already important role 
of the US in the Asia-Pacific (Sutter et al, 2013). For example, then Secretary of the State, 
Hillary Clinton, penned a cornerstone article titled “America’s Pacific Century” in the 
Foreign Policy in November 2011. While the article underscored the State’s developing 
interest and concern over newly-emerging Asian powers like China, India, and Indonesia, 
it read that “The future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and 
the United States will be right at the center of the action.” In line with the principles 
defended in Hillary’s article, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) officially admitted the 
new “rebalance” policy towards Asia-Pacific by issuing a report, called “Sustaining US 
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” in January 2012. Both Hillary’s 
article and DoD report suggest broad military presence in Asia-Pacific and call for 
deepened defense partnerships with the states that resides in the region. Accordingly, the 
NSSRs issued during Obama administration makes it clear that the US keeps a watchful 
eye on possible areas of conflict such as Chinese military development in the region, cyber 
theft of trade secrets and maritime security in order to take counter actions in ensuring the 
security of Americans and its allies in the region.  
The Chinese threat as a global economic and military power is saliently realized when 
President Donald Trump took office in 2017. The economically and politically 
problematic areas that had once only been skimmed through in the previous reports were 
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now stated directly with an all-time assertive and aggressive tone in Trump’s National 
Security Strategy Report. 2017 NSSR accuses China of fentanyl trafficking to US, stealing 
American intellectual property, militarizing South China Sea, investing worldwide to 
disadvantage US interests, exploitation of data, spreading authoritarian regime to other 
nations, provoke other states against the US using economic and military means, 
corruption, developing advanced weapons that could threaten US land, limiting US 
presence in Asia region, challenges American power and many more. Additionally, the 
report states that “states throughout the [Asia-Pacific] region are calling for sustained U.S. 
leadership”. Empirical findings confirms this statement. In a study about the effect of 
competition between China and the U.S. on defense spending of Asia-Pacific countries, 
Fu et al (2013) found out a significant negative relationship between U.S. military 
spending and military spending of 25 Asia-Pacific countries, as the U.S. offers Asia-
Pacific area countries beneficial security. Moreover, one of the statements in 2017 NSSR 
regarding China and Russia was their ambition to shape a world antithetical to US values 
and project power, which is also in line with Basu & Rakhahari’s perspective (2016) that 
China has experienced a transition from operating on defensive realism to the offensive 
form of it. 
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis gave a speech on January 2018 as he took Congress on 
the eve of a potential government shutdown and suggested that the United States must 
build up its military to prepare for the possibility of conflict with Russia and China (Mattis 
unveils new strategy focused on Russia and China, takes Congress to task for budget 
impasse, Washington Post, January 19, 2018). Mattis also said in a speech at Johns 
Hopkins University that “[the US] will continue to prosecute the campaign against 
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terrorists, but great-power competition - not terrorism - is now the primary focus of U.S. 
national security” (BBC, January 19, 2018).  
One can realize the pattern that the US tried to benefit from the peace-dividends after 
the early years of the Post-Cold War. However, cooperative and open-to-dialogue US 
policy with China slightly diminished during Bush administration after the 9/11 attacks. 
While Obama initiated a new Asia-Pacific policy in which China is at the center with 
respect to its military developments, Trump’s assumption to the office in 2017 has enabled 
the US to use an ever aggressive and assertive tone against China since the end of Cold 
War. 
To summarize, China’s military expenditure has risen tremendously in tandem with its 
GDP within the last three decades. The primary sources to understand the US defense 
policy, White House reports and statements given by government officials, suggest that 
China is, if not considered to be a national threat, perceived by the US as an outstanding 
competitor in Asia Pacific and other areas around the world where economic and political 
interests of both parties coincide.  
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CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are four main theoretical approaches towards modelling the demand for military 
expenditure: Richardson’s arms race model (1960), theory of alliances by Olson & 
Zeckhauser (1966), concept of security web developed by Rosh (1988) and Smith’s 
neoclassical model (1989). While pure arms race model is almost abandoned in recent 
years, contemporary empirical research is mostly developed based on Smith’s approach 
where security web and alliance theories are used as supporting elements.  
As a first theoretical attempt to explain the demand for defense expenditure, 
Richardson proposed that international arms races were the main explanation for increases 
in military expenditures. According to the arms race model, military expenditure of a 
country is a function of military expenditure of the dyadic country as a result of 
competitive rivalry between them. Although a large body of empirical literature has 
developed around Richardson’s approach (e.g. Wallace 1979; Anderton 1995; Brito and 
Intriligator 1995), one should note that the arms-race model was established at the height 
of the Cold War in order to explain quickly increasing military expenditures of countries 
(Pamp & Thurner 2017). This concept has been the subject of some considerable number 
of analyses for different combination of nations thought to be practicing arms races, such 
as the Greece/Turkey, US/USSR, Israel/Arab states and India/Pakistan, however, the 
empirical achievement of the arms races model has been limited (Dunne and Smith, 2007).  
Theory of alliances developed in Olson & Zeckhauser’s (1966) seminal work attempted 
to explain the workings and problems of international organizations such as North Atlantic 
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Treaty Organization (NATO). According to the theory, burdens for defending the alliance 
is shared unequally, with the large wealthier allies contributing relatively more to defense 
if the aggregate deterrence created by defense expenditures of allies is a pure public good. 
In this case, if the allies follow Nash behavior, then we can expect some free riding and a 
sub-optimal level of provision when compared to the Pareto optimal standard (Murdoch 
1995). However, var Ypersele de Strihou (1967) argued that defense burden sharing could 
also be influenced by private benefits of defense, meaning that some defense activities 
only provide benefits to the nation undertaking the activities like protection of colonial 
interests and drug traffic interdiction. Accordingly, Sandler (1977) extended the analysis 
of alliance theory by proposing the joint product model, in which an ally yields outputs 
that may be purely public (e.g. deterrence), impurely public (e.g. damage limitation), and 
private (e.g. policing terrorist activities). What distinguishes the pure public good model 
and joint-product model of alliance theory is how one ally responds to the actions of the 
other allies (Murdoch 1995). If total deterrence is a pure public good then an ally is 
expected to respond negatively to an increase in other countries’ contribution to the 
alliance; in other words free-riding occurs. However, because benefits coming from an 
alliance could also be impure or private according to the joint-product model, some 
members might not receive substantial gains relative to others and feel a need to increase 
their own military expenditure along with an increase in military expenditure of other 
countries in the alliance (Murdoch & Sandler 1984). One should notice that while arms 
race model deals with the action-reaction path of military decisions of rival countries, 
alliance theory deals with the same dynamics among allies. For a recent empirical 
application of alliance theory with extension of spatial weight given to countries based on 
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NATO membership, US contiguity, and geographical propinquity, one should refer to 
George & Sandler’s work (2017). 
Due to inconclusive empirical results and limitations of dyadic setting of the arms race 
model, Rosh (1988) developed the idea of Security Web, which signifies a country’s 
consideration of defense spending of potential threat countries along its borders or within 
the regional neighborhood when deciding its own defense spending. Rosh operationalized 
the concept of a security web by averaging the military burdens of those countries, 
primarily in the immediate vicinity of the country been studied, which do or could pose a 
threat to that country (Rosh 1988). For more information and use of Security Web concept, 
readers can refer to works of Dunne & Sam Perlo-Freeman (2003), Dunne et al. (2008), 
and Abdelfattah et al. (2014). 
The Smith’s approach, however, starts from considering the state as a rational agent 
who tries to maximize society’s welfare function, which consists of security, consumption 
and other internal factors. Security component of the welfare function is also dependent 
primarily on military expenditure of the subjected country and external factors such as 
defense spending of allies and/or rivals. Then, demand for military expenditure is derived 
from the maximization of the welfare function under budgetary constraints. According to 
Smith (1989), demand for military expenditure is mainly dependent on national income, 
price levels of military/non-military goods, internal factors, and external factors. 
Notwithstanding, due to unavailability of military goods price level of countries except 
for a few, most studies only include non-military goods price indexes in their models of 
demand for military expenditure. Smith’s neoclassical approach, on which this study is 
developed, will be explained in detail within the next section. 
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Country Specific Regional/Alliance/Dyad Large pool 
  Study Subject Study Subject Study Subject 
C
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Nincic & Cusack (1979) USA         
Smith (1980) UK Olson & Zeckhauser (1966) 14 NATO countries Dudley (1981) 38 countries 
Cusack & Don Ward (1981) 
USA,USS
R,China 
Don Ward (1984) US-USSR Rosh (1988) 63 countries 
Smith (1990) UK  Okamura (1991)  the US-Japan alliance     
Fritz-Aßmus & Zimmrman (1990) Germany         
Looney and Mehay (1990) USA         
Throsby & Withers (2001) Australia         
C
o
ld
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ar
+
P
o
st
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    Kollias and Paleologou (2002) Turkey-Greece     
Sezgin & Yildirim (2002) Turkey Dunne et al. (2003) Greece, Portugal, Spain Dunne & Pablo-Freeman (2003) 98 countries 
    Jun Sik Bae (2004) North-South Korea     
Kollias & Paleologou (2003)  Greece Amara (2008) 14 NATO countries Dunne et al. (2008) 98 countries 
Meanna (2004) USA Yildirim & Ocal (2006) India-Pakistan Albalate et al. (2012) 157 countries 
Solomon (2005) Canada Nikolaidou (2008) 15 European countries Skogstad (2015) 124 countries 
    Ocal & Yildirim (2009) Turkey-Greece Tongur et al (2015) 130 countries 
Bing-Fu & Liming (2006)  China Goo & Kim (2009) 
the US-South Korea 
Alliance 
Bove & Brauner (2016) 64 countries 
Atesoglu (2013) China Dauch & Solomon (2014) 9 Middle powers Solarin (2017) 98 countries 
Abdelfetah  et al. (2014)  Egypt George & Sandler (2017) 27 NATO countries Pamp & Thurner (2017) 156 countres 
P
o
st
 C
o
ld
 W
ar
 This study USA Fu et al. (2013) 25 Asian countries     
    Spangler (2017) 28 Europen countries     
    Christie (2017) 24 European countries     
    Markowski et al (2017) 16 Asia-Pacific countries     
    George et al. (2018) 19 Asia-Pacific countries     
Table 3.1. Past literature related to demand for defense spending 
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Based mostly on Smith’s framework, empirical applications of demand for military 
expenditure are various with respect to subjected countries and methodologies employed. 
In accordance, previous studies can be grouped into three categories as 1. country-specific 
studies that tries to understand the determinants of defense spending of an individual 
country, 2. studies of a group of countries that comprise alliances such as European, 
NATO or represent regional dynamics such as Asian nations, 3. studies that include large 
pool of countries to understand the general behavior of states with respect to security 
concerns. Regarding the time period they investigated the demand for military 
expenditure, these three categories can also be sub-grouped into three: 1. studies that 
concern Cold War times, 2. studies that cover Cold War and Post-Cold War times, 3. Post-
Cold War studies. In fact, only little literature is available covering specifically Post-Cold 
War times.  
Although defense spending of the USA, China, and Russia combined approximately 
50% of the world defense expenditure, almost no empirical research has been conducted 
to investigate the interaction between these great powers with Post-Cold War dynamics. 
Excluding war time mobilization, Nincic and Cusack (1979) found out that the main 
determinants in defense spending of the US were the anticipated utility of defense 
spending for aggregate demand stabilization, the political value of the anticipated 
economic effects, and the pressures arising from institutional-constituency demands 
(Nincic & Cusack, 1979). Cusack & Don Ward (1981) conducted an empirical 
investigation regarding demand for defense expenditure of the US, Russia, and China for 
the Cold War times based on both Ricardson’s ams race model and domestic political 
economy model separately for the purpose of comparison and they reached the conclusion 
50 
 
that there exist little evidence of an arms race among these three great powers. Based on 
domestic political economy model, they found out that change in defense spending of the 
US depends on electoral cycle, change in aggregate demand, change in military 
expenditure, and war mobilization (Cusack & Don Ward, 1981). On the contrary, Don 
Ward (1984) validated the existence of an arms race between the US and the USSR 
employing a continuous time simulation model of the arms expenditure and stockpiles of 
two countries. He defended that great power states react to the stockpiles of weapons 
rather than aggregate defense spending of their perceived opponents and claimed that the 
action-reaction system might need around 3000 years to return to the steady state (Don 
Ward, 1984). Okamura (1991) estimated the impact of a Soviet threat on the US-Japan 
alliance for the 1972-1985 time period and found out that Japan is more sensitive to the 
Soviet threat than the US by 1.5 times. Using a Linear Logarithmic Expenditure System 
(LLES) with a homogeneous generalized-indirect-translog utility function, Okamura also 
determined that “a stable equilibrium of the US-Japan alliance exist with equilibrium level 
of military expenditures of the US and Japan being $150.79 billion and $51.64 billion in 
1982” (Okamura, 1991). Meanna (2004) employed methodologies of Johansen co-
integration and error correction together with vector auto regression (VAR) technique, 
and found out that military spending and economic growth have neither a statistical nor 
an economic impact on each other for the US for the 1959-2001 time period (Meanna, 
2004). Using Smith’s (1989) neoclassical model with OLS, Bing-Fu and Liming (2006) 
found out that Chinese aggregate defense spending depends on lag defense spending, 
China’s GDP and, war time mobilization for the time period from 1960 to 1999. 
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In one of the most recent Post-Cold War studies that took the USA and China into 
consideration, George et al. (2018) conducted a spatial panel analysis for the demand for 
military expenditure for 19 countries located in the Asia-Pacific for the 1991-2015 period. 
Using fixed-coefficient spatial lag (FCSL) model and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
(SUR), they found out that Asian U.S. allies and non-U.S. allies responds negatively to 
Chinese military expenditure, however, consistent with China’s goal for regional 
dominance, China reacts positively to non-U.S. allies’ military expenditure in the region. 
They also detected that US presence in the Asia-Pacific region is providing free-riding 
opportunities, except for select U.S. allies who are treating their military expenditure as 
complementary to that of the United States. 
Markowski et al (2017), measured income elasticity of military expenditure of 15 Indo-
Pacific states including the US, Russia, and China using an autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) model for the period 1990-2014. Using both SIPRI and ADIO (Australia’s 
Defence Intelligence Organisation) data, they found that the elasticity of military 
expenditure to GDP in the region of about unity, which suggest that military expenditure 
is a normal good. In a study about the effect of competition between China and the U.S. 
on defense spending of Asia-Pacific countries, Fu et al (2013) found out a significant 
negative relationship between U.S. military spending and military spending of 25 Asia-
Pacific countries, as the U.S. offers Asia-Pacific area countries beneficial security. In their 
time series analysis on Egypt for the period 1960-2009, Abdelfattah et al. (2014) found 
out that military spending of a rival, Israel, has positive effects Egypt’s demand for 
military expenditure while military spending of allies, Syria and Jordan, does not show 
any significant effect. They also pointed out the institutional inertia of Egypt due to the 
52 
 
positive effects of lagged military burden on the current spending. Douch and Solomon 
(2014) attempted to measure middle-power states’ demand for military expenditure using 
panel data of nine countries for the period 1955-2007. Employing Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression Equations (SURE), they suggested that positive income elasticity of military 
expenditure might imply that middle-powers are increasing their military expenditure due 
to their status seeking behavior among others. There were also studies focused on 
relatively homogenous group of countries to find out the determinants of demand for 
military expenditure. Dunne, Nikolaidou and Mylonidis (2003) worked on Spain, 
Portugal, and Greece for the time interval 1960-2000 using auto regressive distributed 
lagged (ARDL) model. Their results showed that while Spain and Greece is not a free-
rider on NATO, there was evidence towards free-riding of Portugal on NATO. There was 
also strong evidence on positive correlation between output and military spending in the 
short run for the three of these countries.  
Because the literature for demand for defense spending is vast in subjects aimed, 
methodologies employed, and time interval interested, readers shall refer to Table 3.1. for 
any further specific information.  
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CHAPTER IV 
ADOPTED THEORY AND MODEL 
To investigate the effects of internal and external factors on defense policy of the 
States, Smith’s (1989) neoclassical model is employed to derive the demand for military 
expenditure of the US. According to Smith, states are rational actors seeking to maximize 
a welfare function that encapsulates consumption (C), security (S), and other internal 
political factors (ZP). Welfare function is given by: 
      W = f (S, C, ZP)                                                                       (1) 
The constraint the state faces when maximizing welfare is: 
Y = PM . M + PC . C                                                                     (2) 
where Y is the aggregate national income, PM and PC are the prices of military 
expenditures, M, and consumption, C, respectively.  
The other constraint is the security function, which is determined by the military 
expenditure of the subjective state, and other security variables, ZS, such as the military 
expenditure of allies and/or rivals: 
     S = S (M, ZS)                                                                           (3) 
Maximization of (1) with respect to (2) and (3) gives the demand function for military 
expenditures. 
     M = D (Y, PM/PC, ZP, ZS)                                                                 (4) 
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Equation (4) is the general form of demand for military expenditure function of a 
rational state, where military expenditure is determined by total national income, Y, 
military to civilian price ratio, PM/PC, internal political factors, ZP, and external security 
variables, ZS. Although it is assumed that military and civilian prices behave the same 
way and usually dropped from the analysis in the literature (Murdoch and Sandler 1984) 
(Smith 1995) (Douch and Solomon 2014), we included the price ratio in our model to test 
whether this assumption is sound or not. 
For the purpose of the study, the specified model for US demand for defense burden is 
structured as the following semi-logarithmic linear equation: 
lnMUSt = ß1 + ß2(lnMUSt-4) + ß3(USYgt) + ß4(lnPRt)  
    + ß5(lnMChit) +ß6(lnMRust) + ß7(t) + εt……………..…….…(5) 
where the State’s defense burden (lnMUSt) becomes a function of lagged military burden 
(MUSt-4), growth rate (USY
g)
t, price ratio (lnPRt), defense burden of Russia (lnMRust), 
defense burden of China (lnMChit) and the trend variable (t). Defense burdens were used 
instead of aggregate levels of defense spending as a common application to normalize the 
effect of the magnitude of economies that differ between the states on defense spending. 
The explanatory variables of the present model are the following: 
 lnMUSt-4 is natural logarithm of four period lag of defense burden. Including this 
variable is important since it accounts for bureaucratic inertia of a state. MUSt-4 is 
a one year lag consistent with the literature. The coefficient is expected to be 
positive since future military spending of naval, war planes, and ground forces are 
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related to more spending when considering maintenance, personnel, and prevailing 
war costs.  
 lnUSYg is growth rate of the US GDP. Studies that investigates growth-milex 
nexus have conflicting results on whether there is a negative or positive 
relationship between the two parameters. 
 lnPRt is natural logarithm of the relative price of defense with respect to civilian 
goods in the US economy. 
 lnMChit is the natural logarithm of defense burden of People’s Republic of China. 
The effect of Chinese military spending is expected to be positive, at least for some 
periods of the data due to China’s military modernization policies in the last couple 
of decades. 
 lnMRust is the natural logarithm of defense burden of Russian Federation. The 
coefficient is expected to be positive due to prolonged rivalry between the US and 
Russia in the international arena. 
 t is trend and captures other internal and external factors other than employed 
explanatory variables.  
 εt  is the error term. 
 
Appendix – A provides some more information concerning the inclusion the US 
competitors and allies into the model. 
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Figure 3.1. Times-series plots of the dependent and explanatory variables 
 
The individual times-series plots of the natural logarithms of defense burdens of the 
US, Russia, China, and the price ratio as well as the growth rate of the US economy are 
presented. The first notable feature of the graphs is the quickly decreasing levels of 
defense burdens starting from 1992 until 2000, which is attributed to the peace dividends 
with the end of Cold War. While the effect of global economic crises sparkled in 2007 is 
observed in fallen defense burdens of Russia and China, it is interesting to see the US 
defense burden not affected, yet a made drastic rise up until 2012 (the year in which signs 
of economic recovery started to be seen). After 2012, while the US and Russian defense 
burdens showed a decrease and increase respectively, defense burden of China stayed 
relatively more stable, around its 2000 level. Relative price of defense continuously 
57 
 
declined beginning from 1992, rose drastically in 2001 and 2003 possibly due to the 
Afghan and Iraq Wars, and started to decline again after reaching its highest level in the 
third quarter of 2008. The positive growth rate of the US economy showed a great decline 
in 2007 due to the economic crises and reached its lowest level in the fourth quarter of 
2008. Starting from fourth quarter of 2019, the growth rate began to reveal positive levels 
and achieved its highest level in the third quarter of 2014 since the economic crises.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
CHAPTER V 
DATA & METHODOLOGY 
Quarterly data of the US defense spending, GDP, real growth rates, and price levels for 
1992Q1-2016Q4 time period are retrieved from the BEA (the US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis). US defense burden is derived as the ratio of the US defense spending to its 
GDP. Annual defense burdens data for Russia and China are appropriated from SIPRI 
Military Expenditures Database for the same time period and interpolated into quarterly 
data using Gretl. As a common practice in the literature, all data are transformed into 
natural logarithm for the purpose to interpret the coefficients as elasticities. The final data 
included 100 quarterly observations from 1992Q1 to 2016Q4 in natural logarithm form.  
Our analysis is based on interval estimates produced by a Meboot data generation 
process in tandem with a fixed-width rolling window framework. Introduced by Vinod & 
de-Lacalle (2004), Meboot is one of the newly developed and advanced bootstrap method 
that is purposefully constructed to bypass the issues emerged from traditional bootstrap 
methods such as distortion of the dependence and heterogeneity information when 
reordering the original data (Vinod 2004) (Vinod 2006) (Koutris et al., 2008). The 
Meboot-DGP can escape from such problematic situations by employing a seven-step 
algorithm that creates replicates keeping the original data’s basic shape. It also preserves 
the original data with respect to the dependence structure of the autocorrelation function 
and the partial autocorrelation function. This process offers some desirable statistical 
properties, such as satisfying the ergodic theorem, Doob’s theorem, as well as the central 
limit theorem (Altinay & Yalta, 2016) (Vinod and de Lacalle, 2009). This means that, 
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increase in sample size makes p-values resulted in a statistical test run on a replicate to 
converge to that of the original series (Yalta, 2013). Producing a vast number of such 
replicates without having to know their multimodal and non-normal functional forms 
allows us to construct numerical sampling distributions for various pivotal statistics 
(Vinod, 2003). Moreover, it supplies with more robust and reliable empirical analysis 
because it provides a simplified methodology that could be employed in different forms 
of non-stationarity including near unit roots or long memory, which are generally hard to 
recognize with confidence in small samples without differencing or ARMA 
transformations (Yalta, 2011) (Yalta, 2013) (Yalta & Yalta, 2016). 
There are three fundamental conveniences of using Meboot DGP in our analysis of 
demand for military expenditure. First, the confidence intervals produced by Meboot 
based on simulation can provide considerably more robust and reliable estimates of the 
coefficients, when compared to those based on the asymptotic theory (Yalta & Yalta, 
2016). Robustness of the method was shown in a large scale simulation study conducted 
by Yalta (2016) and in a study by Singvejsakul et al (2018). Second, the Meboot DGP can 
be employed under different cases of non-stationarity such as long memory, fractional 
integration and multiple structural breaks, which could be complex to point out during 
analysis. This advantage facilitate to escape from hidden specification errors that prevail 
because of cointegration or pretesting for unit roots (Altinay & Yalta 2016). In our case, 
we expect such structural breaks in the US demand for military expenditures especially 
during the global economic crisis around 2008. Third, using a technique specifically 
designed for small samples, called Meboot rolling windows analysis, makes it possible to 
observe the evolution of parameters over time with unveiling economic, political, and 
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military conditions, thereby providing with improved information required by policy 
makers. The window width of the analysis is selected to be 32 in order to be able to cover 
two presidential time fully within the regressions. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Meboot rolling window estimates for the US defense demand function (5) are presented 
in Graph 5.1-5.6. For the purpose of comparison, the standard OLS confidence intervals 
for each window are included in the figures as well. The figures display that Meboot and 
OLS both yield close results but Meboot is considerably more efficient. The sharp rise 
and falls of the coefficients and instantly narrowed confidence intervals that arise from 
autocorrelation deems OLS biased and unreliable. As can be seen from the graphs, 
however, Me-boot rolling windows provides smoother and robust estimates compared to 
the OLS results. All empirical findings reported below are at 80% significance level and 
the adjusted R-square of the model is 90%. All explanatory variables are interpreted for 
three different time intervals, specifically (1) prior to the economic crises during 2000-
2007, (2) during the economic crises during 2007-2012, (3) post-economic crises during 
2012-2016.  
The first independent variable of the model is one year lagged of military spending of 
the US that would show how the bureaucratic inertia is in effect. While the coefficient 
displays a significant positive relationship averaged between 0.2-1%, its evolution in time 
changes according to the economic condition the state is in. With respect to the time period 
prior to the 2007 economic crises, the coefficient of lag military burden is in an increasing 
pattern beginning from the military involvement of the US in Afghanistan and hits its 
maximum level with 0.8 in mid-2003. Although the coefficient enters into a steady level 
with 0.7 afterwards, a sharp decrease is observed starting from 2004. The coefficient 
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reaches its minimum level with 0.2 in 2008 just after the economic crises hit the US 
economy. The average level of the coefficient is revealed to be 0.35 during the period of 
economic crises between 2007 and 2012. With the signs of economic recovery started to 
be seen in the US economy, the evolution of the respective coefficient makes a sharp 
increase around mid-2011 and again enters into an increasing pattern, which is more 
accelerated this time, and reaches its maximum level with 1.1 in 2014. Although the 
coefficient of lag military burden enters a decreasing pattern after 2014, it only falls to 
0.7, the level observed before the economic crises.  
Graph 5.1. Evolution of coefficient: “Lag military burden” of the US 
The second independent variable of the model is the growth rate of the US economy, 
which captures the effect of magnitude of the economy on military burden. Note that the 
interpretation of the respective coefficient must be made carefully since growth rate data 
is not in logarithmic form. For this reason, the coefficient should be adjusted by 
multiplying it by 100 in order to interpret the results as elasticities. This variable is 
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investigated in three sub-periods, namely pre-crises that shows the relationship without 
the economic crisis before 2007, crises between 2007 and 2012, and post-crises that 
displays the relationship after 2012. In pre-crises period, although very small, real growth 
displays a significant positive correlation with military burden between 2002 and 2008 
and the magnitude of the coefficient reaches its maximum level averaged 0.004% in 2007, 
meaning that a 1 percentage point increase in growth rate would cause a 0.4% increase in 
military burden of the US. Although the magnitude seems small, considering, with 2015 
prices, approximately $600 billion of aggregate defense spending of the US, a 0.4% 
increase would result a $2424 million increase, which is higher than military spending of 
some important countries in their respective regions such as Venezuela, New Zealand, and 
Azerbaijan. The sharp decrease of the coefficient after 2007 until 2009 shows the effect 
of the global economic crises on military spending of the US clearly. During the crises 
time, confidence intervals are broadened and the correlation loses its significance between 
2008 and 2012. It is of importance to mention that both aggregate defense expenditure 
and defense burden of the US had still been increasing during the global economic crisis. 
After the signs of recovery started to be seen about the end of 2011, the correlation 
between military spending and growth rate changes sign and significant negative 
relationship is observed until 2015, which is the year that the US economy revealed the 
highest growth rate since the 2007 economic crises. In 2014, negative correlation reaches 
its maximum level with 0.006%, whereas the positive correlation was 0.004% just before 
the 2007 economic crises. This leads to the conclusion that relationship between growth 
and military burden is stronger after an economic crises when compared to no-crises times. 
The negative correlation between military spending and growth rate of the US seems to 
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change its during-crises pattern after 2014 with a sharp increase in coefficient that is 
similar to the sharp increase seen just after 2007. Confidence intervals became narrower 
and magnitude of the coefficient started to increase after 2014. Although no significant 
relationship can be reported after 2015, the trend of the coefficient is increasing towards 
a positive relationship. This can only be confirmed with more data revealed in the 
upcoming years. The findings are consistent with Dudley 1981, Kollias & Paleologou 
2003, Nikolaidou 2008, Pamp & Thurner 2017, Markowski, Chand & Wylie 2017, 
George, Hou & Sandler 2018 for the pre-crises period, Dunne & Perlo-Freeman 2003, 
Solomon 2005, Mehanna 2004 for the crises period, and Sezgin & Yildirim 2002, 
Abdelfattah et al 2014 for the post-crises period. 2,4 
Graph 5.2. Evolution of coefficient: “Growth rate” of the US 
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It was shown before in the aforementioned studies that different relationships between 
defense burden and growth rate could be observed among states that differ in development 
stages and geographies. The present study showed that even one sole state may display 
different behaviors with respect to growth-milex nexus within specific time frames that 
prevail particular political and economic specifications. Thus, concerning the sign of the 
coefficient, an absolute conclusion about the growth-milex nexus is hard to achieve.  
The inclusion of military to civilian price ratio as an explanatory variable of the US 
demand for defense spending was important since other studies of demand for military 
expenditure dropped this parameter from their analysis due to data availability issue. The 
price ratio capture relative costliness of national defense with respect to civilian goods. 
According to the findings, there exist a significantly positive correlation between US 
defense spending and price ratio starting just after the US troops entered Afghanistan as a 
response to 9/11 attacks in 2001. This positive correlation reaches its highest level 
averaged approximately 2.5% with the beginning of US operation in Iraq in 2003 and 
lasted until the end of George W. Bush’s presidential office time. The positive correlation 
observed between 2002 and 2008 is contradicting result to the law of demand as a 1% 
increase in relative prices correlates with an average of 1% increase in military burden. 
Correlation almost fully disappears after 2008 except for a small negative one between 
2010Q2-2011Q2 and a small positive one between 2015Q1-Q3. Moreover, the small 
negative correlation observed between 2010Q2-2011Q2 coincides with Barack Obama’s 
announcements of the US military policy when he decides to halve the US troops in Iraq 
in 2010 and to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan in 2011 (US military 'on track' to 
reduce troops in Iraq to 50,000, The Telegraph, May 31, 2010). Obama’s reversed decision 
66 
 
about keeping some US troops in Afghanistan in 2015 also coincides with small positive 
correlation observed between 2015Q1 and 2015Q3 (A timeline of U.S. troop levels in 
Afghanistan since 2001, The Associated Press, July 6, 2016). Observing the evolution of 
this coefficient, it is interesting to see how military spending is related with price ratio 
when there are signs of high military activity and how not related once the military tension 
is decreased.  
Graph 5.3. Evolution of coefficient: “Defense prices/civilian prices” of the US  
When looking at political and military events that coincide with the critical points of 
the plot, it may be conceived by the defense industry producers as a demand signal to 
increase prices. It should be noted that defense burden of the US rose by 25% by 2008 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union and relative prices of military goods reached its 
maximum level in 2008 during George W. Bush presidency. As an important contribution 
to the literature, this finding captured the effect of relative price change on military burden: 
effect of relative prices on defense spending revealed to be positive and significant during 
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high signaling of military activity, and not significant when there is relatively less military 
tension.  
China has gone under a military modernization process that led to an accelerated 
increase in its military spending within the last three decades. It is of importance to include 
China in the US demand for defense considering China has increased its defense spending 
by 8,5 times from 1994 to 2016, compared to a 1,2 times increase of the US for the same 
period.  
Graph 5.4. Evolution of coefficient: “Chinese defense burden” 
According to the analysis, the correlation coefficient is significantly positive for the 
most of the time data covered and also shows accelerated rise after 2012. For the pre-
crises period, the coefficient is significantly positive and relatively in a stable level around 
0.3 meaning that a 1% increase in Chinese defense burden is correlated with a 0.3% 
increase in the US one. Although coefficient for the China effect loses significance during 
the crises period between 2007 and 2012, it makes a rise afterwards and reaches 
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approximately to 1 in 2014 as its maximum value throughout the last three decades. This 
suggests evidence towards a significant rivalry between the US and China with the 
beginning of the 2nd millennium till today. It is very important to underscore that the 
relatively greater increase observed at the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012 coincides 
with the US new Asia-Pacific strategy, known as “re-balance” or “pivot” to Asia. Asia 
Rebalance strategy of Obama administration was revealed by the publication of then-
secretary of the state Hillary Clinton’s article in the Foreign Policy, named “America’s 
Pacific Century”. The article emphasizes strong cooperation with the defense alliances of 
the US and stresses on broad-based military presence in the Asia-Pacific region while 
China being at the center of this new shift of strategy (Clinton, 2011) (Sutter et al, 2013). 
Russia has been the main competitive force of the US up until the end of Cold War. 
Signs of pursuits of peace dividends have been observed from the evolution of defense 
burdens of the US, NATO members and Russia after the Cold War. This explanatory 
variable will be analyzed in three sub-periods, namely, pre-crises before 2007 global 
economic crises, crises time from 2007 up until the signs of economic recovery began to 
be seen in 2012, and post-crises after 2012. According to the findings of this study the 
correlation coefficient between the US and Russian defense spending is in an increasing 
pattern from the beginning of the second millennium until 2012, although insignificant in 
some of the years data covered. In the pre-crises period, the correlation is positive but the 
reported coefficient is at very low levels around 0.1 meaning that a 1% increase in Russian 
defense burden correlates with an approximately 0.1% increase in the US defense burden.  
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Graph 5.5. Evolution of coefficient: “Russian defense burden” 
The correlation coefficient enters into an increasing pattern in 2007 and ends up with the 
coefficient’s maximum value with 0.3 in 2012 for the crises period. Notwithstanding, after 
the recovery of the global economic crisis, the positive correlation loses its significance 
with broader confidence intervals. After 2012, many political and military issues emerged 
between the US and Russia including the acceptance of Edward Snowden’s asylum in 
Russia in 2013, Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the emergence of the Syrian 
civil war in 2015, which many including the US Senator John McCain interpreted as a 
proxy war between the US and Russia (Shapiro & Estrin, 2014). (The New York Times 
October 12, 2015) (John McCain says US is engaged in proxy war with Russia in Syria. 
The Guardian, October 4, 2015) (Bremmer, 2018). Although some sanctions such as 
suspending Russia from the G8 had been enacted as a counteraction to the annexation of 
the Ukrainian Crimea, U.S. then-president Obama acknowledged that Crimea’s 
annexation by Russia would be hard to reverse. Obama, also, recognized Russia’s regional 
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power and argued that Russia did not possess a considerable threat to the U.S. security 
(Haddad & Polyakova, 2018). Thus, Obama administration’s relatively downgraded 
approach to Russia was also consistent with the US new Asia-Pacific rebalance policy and 
might be the cause of the fall in correlation coefficient after 2012. Overall, although the 
US military burden is in correlation with the Russian one throughout almost two decades, 
it loses significance with the assumption of Obama to the US presidency.  
The trend component of the US demand for defense is the last explanatory independent 
variable of the model that is designed to capture all other domestic/global political/military 
variables and will be analyzed in three sub-periods of time taking the global financial 
crises into consideration: pre-crises, crises, and post-crises periods. When Graph 5.6. is 
examined generally, the consistently increasing pattern of the trend variable draws 
attention for the time period between 2000 and 2014.  
Graph 5. 6: Evolution of the trend variable 
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This might show the US response to the global rise of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks. 
The US had involved in military operations in many states around the world including 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya against terrorist organizations such as al-
Qaeda and ISIS. With respect to pre-crises period, there exist a significant negative trend 
until 2002, which indicates pursuit of peace dividends after the Cold War, while the sharp 
increase observed in 2001 could probably signifies the effect of 9/11 on the US defense 
burden. Between 2002 and 2007, no significant trend is reported. For the crises period 
between 2007 and 2012, a significant positive trend attracts attention. Both the aggregate 
defense spending and defense burden of the US displays increases during this time period, 
meaning that the US could not contract, but expand its defense spending while its 
economy was shrinking. To speculate on this point, one might suggest that the US wished 
to achieve more military advantage against states with already-weakened economies 
during the crises period or used defense spending as a tool to boost its domestic economy. 
For the post-crises period, the trend of military burden again begins to sink, although 
insignificantly. It reaches its pre-crises values in 2014 and again enters into a significant 
negative trend after 2015.  
The analysis was also done with the same explanatory variables without the inclusion 
of relative prices. Adjusted R-square only dropped 0.5 percentage points in the new model 
and results showed almost no difference with respect to all variables except for lagged 
military burden. While preserving the shape of the evolution of the coefficient, exclusion 
of relative prices from the model seems to overestimate the effect of lagged military 
burden by approximately 20%. While this finding confirms the relevance of the drop of 
prices from defense demand models of which previous studies applied, the interpretation 
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regarding the coefficient of the lagged military burden in such models should be made 
more carefully.  
In summary, the US demand for defense spending is affected by different magnitudes 
of the explanatory variables in different time periods. While the determinants of the US 
defense spending is (1) lag military burden, (2) growth rate of its economy, (3) relative 
costliness of defense, and (4) defense burden of Russia (5) defense burden of China and 
(6) trend for the time period prior to the 2007 economic crises, effect of all explanatory 
variables disappears except for the lag military burden and the trend variable during the 
economic crises between 2007 and 2012. For the post-crises period, the US demand for 
defense spending is affected by (1) lag military burden, (2) growth rate of its economy, 
and (3) the Chinese defense burden, though their magnitudes are revealed to be greater 
than observed before the economic crises. 
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Table 5.1. Me-boot based interval estimates of the coefficients of the model 
Time lower point upper lower point upper lower point upper lower point upper lower point upper lower point upper lower point upper
2000Q4 0,4529 0,9662 1,4513 0,0622 0,3349 0,6166 -0,0009 0,0014 0,0039 -1,6406 0,0233 2,1415 -0,0918 0,1679 0,3852 -0,0367 0,0392 0,1173 -0,0126 -0,0082 -0,0028
2001Q1 0,403 1,0018 1,4329 0,0474 0,3377 0,6234 -0,002 0,0003 0,0028 -1,7704 -0,0093 1,8077 -0,1066 0,203 0,4613 -0,0287 0,0493 0,1293 -0,0127 -0,0077 -0,0026
2001Q2 0,3541 0,8677 1,3996 0,0676 0,3544 0,6424 -0,0014 0,0004 0,0031 -1,7563 0,0907 1,82 -0,0927 0,2228 0,5124 -0,0309 0,0558 0,141 -0,0125 -0,0071 -0,0022
2001Q3 0,3118 0,7923 1,3424 0,0768 0,3809 0,6688 -0,0023 0 0,002 -1,6914 -0,1182 1,6582 -0,0393 0,2317 0,5197 -0,0325 0,0581 0,1476 -0,0121 -0,0068 -0,0022
2001Q4 0,2815 0,6185 1,3836 0,0384 0,5004 0,6835 -0,0021 0,0001 0,0022 -1,3124 0,138 1,9099 -0,022 0,2453 0,4995 -0,0211 0,0483 0,1475 -0,0116 -0,0057 -0,0009
2002Q1 0,1983 0,7048 1,1988 0,121 0,3147 0,7352 -0,0012 0,001 0,0036 0,0211 1,0074 2,1925 0,0135 0,2967 0,5086 -0,0065 0,0892 0,172 -0,0092 -0,0044 0
2002Q2 0,0846 0,5336 0,9861 0,1889 0,4851 0,768 0,0003 0,0026 0,005 0,4729 1,5005 2,6422 0,0773 0,3048 0,5245 0,0112 0,0914 0,2069 -0,0083 -0,0026 0,0005
2002Q3 0,02 0,5082 0,9423 0,2089 0,4908 0,8107 0,0003 0,0033 0,0049 0,7124 1,794 2,9574 0,0394 0,2899 0,5008 0,0054 0,1036 0,2059 -0,0066 -0,0022 0,0024
2002Q4 -0,0751 0,3685 0,8638 0,2936 0,6322 0,8593 0 0,0021 0,0049 1,4227 2,4458 3,5221 0,0335 0,2377 0,4576 0,0012 0,0986 0,2054 -0,0047 0,0001 0,0032
2003Q1 -0,0717 0,3201 0,8504 0,2875 0,5696 0,8594 0 0,0023 0,0048 1,3147 1,9656 2,7421 0,0698 0,2778 0,4771 0,0126 0,0948 0,2039 -0,0049 -0,0012 0,0024
2003Q2 -0,2366 0,1374 0,5967 0,4272 0,6947 0,9589 0,0009 0,003 0,0052 1,1148 1,8522 2,5397 0,0511 0,2557 0,4573 -0,0039 0,0923 0,1877 -0,0026 -0,001 0,0039
2003Q3 -0,3313 0,002 0,4947 0,5003 0,8098 1,0001 0,0005 0,0032 0,0044 0,8355 1,6055 2,2799 0,0918 0,3173 0,4996 -0,0094 0,0917 0,1725 -0,0026 0,0003 0,0031
2003Q4 -0,3142 0,0344 0,4023 0,5491 0,7693 0,9861 0,0006 0,0025 0,0042 0,7857 1,4297 2,1155 0,0994 0,2887 0,5024 -0,0012 0,0814 0,1693 -0,0019 0,0006 0,0027
2004Q1 -0,2773 0,0809 0,3833 0,563 0,7553 0,956 0,0011 0,0023 0,0048 0,5993 1,323 2,0827 0,1105 0,2907 0,4859 0,0047 0,0948 0,1561 -0,0016 0,0008 0,0028
2004Q2 -0,1937 0,0783 0,4026 0,5576 0,7348 0,8828 0,0009 0,0031 0,0051 0,3847 1,2191 2,0006 0,0876 0,2691 0,4675 0,0169 0,0892 0,1634 -0,0016 0,0004 0,0029
2004Q3 -0,1297 0,1993 0,4395 0,5501 0,6985 0,8511 0,0015 0,0029 0,0059 0,3246 1,0553 1,8201 0,0176 0,2185 0,3955 0,0128 0,085 0,1524 -0,0004 0,0021 0,0039
2004Q4 0,0172 0,3318 0,602 0,4604 0,5868 0,7512 0,0018 0,0037 0,0058 0,5441 1,3365 2,0701 0,0107 0,198 0,3662 0,0097 0,0789 0,1508 -0,0005 0,0013 0,0035
2005Q1 -0,0655 0,2204 0,5665 0,4801 0,6591 0,7979 0,0012 0,0032 0,0052 0,3476 1,0792 1,8966 0,0453 0,2317 0,4077 0,0083 0,0816 0,1581 -0,0012 0,0015 0,0033
2005Q2 -0,1802 0,2269 0,5821 0,4663 0,6565 0,8515 0,0009 0,0028 0,0053 0,2799 1,0897 1,96 0,0634 0,2576 0,4677 -0,0073 0,0756 0,1781 -0,0018 0,0009 0,0031
2005Q3 -0,3137 0,1899 0,5992 0,4622 0,681 0,9143 0,001 0,0032 0,0054 0,2751 1,0539 1,8589 0,0831 0,342 0,5035 -0,024 0,0893 0,2104 -0,0026 0,0007 0,0029
2005Q4 -0,358 0,2309 0,7989 0,3721 0,6592 0,9509 0,0015 0,0031 0,0058 0,0875 0,9828 1,8433 0,2143 0,3916 0,6098 -0,1715 -0,0242 0,1624 -0,0024 0,0004 0,003
2006Q1 -0,4653 0,1971 0,8247 0,3546 0,6661 0,9978 0,0009 0,0028 0,0054 0,0064 0,809 1,7363 0,2205 0,4457 0,6525 -0,1959 -0,0315 0,1874 -0,0028 0,0001 0,0036
2006Q2 -0,2487 0,3274 1,0144 0,22 0,5943 0,8834 0,0013 0,0038 0,0069 0,1088 0,903 1,7886 0,2709 0,4754 0,7065 -0,2835 -0,0891 0,1028 -0,002 0,001 0,0038
2006Q3 -0,2995 0,3 0,9585 0,1902 0,5532 0,8389 0,0019 0,005 0,0077 0,1894 1,131 1,8664 0,3018 0,535 0,7966 -0,2567 -0,0613 0,1432 -0,0021 0,0009 0,0035
2006Q4 -0,0909 0,4809 1,0596 0,1057 0,455 0,6991 0,0021 0,0045 0,0079 0,1349 0,9392 1,8126 0,2859 0,5316 0,813 -0,3007 -0,0819 0,1139 -0,0008 0,0005 0,004
2007Q1 -0,1425 0,3708 1,0452 0,1101 0,4652 0,7069 0,0026 0,005 0,0085 0,0692 0,9126 1,7832 0,317 0,5429 0,8291 -0,3222 -0,0672 0,1357 -0,0003 0,0016 0,004
2007Q2 -0,0728 0,4245 1,0685 0,0786 0,4416 0,6394 0,0023 0,0051 0,0084 0,0845 0,8093 1,7108 0,3003 0,5242 0,7828 -0,3137 -0,0668 0,1615 0,0004 0,0019 0,0043
2007Q3 0,0569 0,6043 1,1302 -0,0066 0,3367 0,5762 0,0027 0,0052 0,0084 -0,0891 0,7121 1,6225 0,2497 0,444 0,7129 -0,3213 -0,0465 0,1842 0,0018 0,0035 0,0053
2007Q4 -0,0453 0,5443 1,126 -0,0367 0,29 0,5871 0,0019 0,0048 0,007 -0,1288 0,6309 1,5323 0,1335 0,3773 0,6418 -0,2802 0,0171 0,3384 0,0022 0,004 0,0061
2008Q1 -0,0686 0,5065 1,3259 -0,1147 0,2026 0,5836 0,0006 0,0025 0,0055 -0,4676 0,5481 1,579 0,0489 0,3366 0,5523 -0,3074 0,0503 0,3695 0,0024 0,0057 0,0085
2008Q2 -0,3218 0,4598 1,2137 -0,0763 0,2987 0,632 -0,0009 0,0027 0,0054 -0,8345 0,1322 1,2505 0,011 0,3029 0,6196 -0,2929 0,0508 0,4064 0,0034 0,0061 0,009
2008Q3 -0,5128 0,5128 1,3727 -0,1002 0,2623 0,6696 -0,0025 0,0008 0,0047 -0,9112 0,1559 1,4101 -0,0733 0,3327 0,6723 -0,2988 0,0119 0,4817 0,0027 0,0066 0,01
2008Q4 -0,4796 0,2839 1,0752 -0,0406 0,4857 0,7708 -0,0043 -0,0002 0,002 -0,8288 0,1283 1,372 -0,3171 0,0765 0,557 -0,1045 0,2077 0,5366 0,002 0,0051 0,0097
2009Q1 -0,09 0,4889 1,1202 -0,0475 0,4071 0,729 -0,0042 -0,0014 0,0019 -0,6933 0,385 1,5749 -0,4725 0,0848 0,5899 -0,0962 0,1344 0,4187 0,001 0,005 0,0089
2009Q2 -0,0947 0,3846 0,884 0,0266 0,4698 0,815 -0,0047 -0,0009 0,0019 -0,8399 0,123 1,0646 -0,5995 0,0228 0,5143 -0,0283 0,2375 0,5002 0,0017 0,004 0,0086
2009Q3 -0,0687 0,2668 0,8123 0,0897 0,5698 0,8301 -0,0052 -0,0017 0,0015 -1,017 -0,1116 0,7954 -0,5877 0,0387 0,5102 -0,0473 0,1986 0,4773 0,0011 0,0045 0,0083
2009Q4 0,0237 0,3885 0,8291 0,1084 0,4333 0,7563 -0,0059 -0,0031 0,0009 -1,2566 -0,4273 0,5402 -0,5543 0,083 0,6131 -0,1163 0,1692 0,434 0,0017 0,0048 0,0083
2010Q1 0,0619 0,435 0,9048 0,0719 0,4133 0,7343 -0,0058 -0,0023 0,0013 -1,2231 -0,409 0,4175 -0,6169 -0,0054 0,5483 -0,0593 0,1985 0,4505 0,0017 0,0046 0,0083
2010Q2 0,1021 0,4319 0,8572 0,0718 0,3657 0,6942 -0,0057 -0,002 0,0017 -1,2403 -0,4562 0,3146 -0,5379 -0,0067 0,4478 -0,0201 0,2064 0,4211 0,0019 0,0045 0,0082
2010Q3 0,1387 0,387 0,9514 0,0783 0,4298 0,6483 -0,0059 -0,0024 0,0009 -1,5274 -0,7689 -0,0988 -0,5749 -0,1002 0,2963 0,0106 0,2472 0,4465 0,0018 0,0034 0,0082
2010Q4 0,1746 0,4302 0,9741 0,0614 0,3398 0,6207 -0,007 -0,0036 0,0005 -1,7834 -1,0192 -0,2516 -0,5486 -0,1421 0,2417 0,0623 0,2718 0,4632 0,0015 0,0045 0,0074
2011Q1 0,1912 0,4896 1,0157 -0,013 0,2686 0,5448 -0,0062 -0,0029 0,0013 -1,5377 -0,7544 -0,1166 -0,5136 -0,0143 0,3049 0,0765 0,283 0,4794 0,0019 0,0052 0,0077
Russian Defense Burden Trend
beta_hat_0
Constant Lag Defense Burden Growth Rate Price Ratio Chinese Defense Burden
beta_hat_6beta_hat_2 beta_hat_3 beta_hat_4 beta_hat_5beta_hat_1
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Table 5.2. Me-boot based interval estimates of the coefficients of the model (Continued) 
Table 5.3. Coefficient averages for different sub-periods 
Time lower point upper lower point upper lower point upper lower point upper lower point upper lower point upper lower point upper
2011Q2 0,1262 0,4091 1,0374 -0,0356 0,2918 0,547 -0,0064 -0,0024 0,0012 -1,6601 -0,7951 -0,0972 -0,4174 0,0627 0,4724 -0,0266 0,205 0,4253 0,0024 0,0044 0,0083
2011Q3 0,1292 0,4496 1,089 -0,1245 0,2302 0,5549 -0,0062 -0,0032 0,0017 -1,5068 -0,7312 0,0108 -0,3962 0,104 0,4711 -0,0329 0,1837 0,4787 0,0024 0,0051 0,0083
2011Q4 0,0519 0,4461 1,0374 -0,12 0,2525 0,5894 -0,0063 -0,0038 -0,0007 -1,2507 -0,2459 0,3387 -0,4439 0,1106 0,6199 -0,0679 0,2965 0,5811 0,0014 0,0046 0,0082
2012Q1 -0,2087 0,2429 0,8162 0,0524 0,4312 0,8273 -0,0071 -0,0045 -0,0016 -1,2769 -0,2814 0,517 -0,2028 0,4493 1,0322 -0,2969 0,0225 0,3465 0,0006 0,0048 0,0084
2012Q2 -0,3925 0,1034 0,627 0,1764 0,5715 1,0326 -0,0075 -0,0046 -0,0012 -1,2832 -0,2367 0,6672 0,1043 0,7483 1,3256 -0,5265 -0,2273 0,125 0 0,0045 0,0085
2012Q3 -0,4224 0,0359 0,518 0,2328 0,6349 1,0653 -0,0068 -0,0041 -0,0002 -0,669 0,3397 1,3289 0,2102 0,7882 1,4855 -0,6127 -0,2874 0,0997 -0,0001 0,0047 0,0087
2012Q4 -0,5045 -0,0616 0,3614 0,3661 0,7289 1,182 -0,0073 -0,0037 -0,0001 -0,8677 0,3529 1,5268 0,2126 0,9 1,5669 -0,6759 -0,3168 0,0701 -0,0017 0,0042 0,0082
2013Q1 -0,5624 -0,1829 0,2114 0,5985 0,8357 1,276 -0,0085 -0,0054 -0,0018 -1,0543 0,3566 1,488 0,1744 1,0128 1,7058 -0,8133 -0,4375 0,0371 -0,0028 0,0035 0,0073
2013Q2 -0,6365 -0,2379 0,0976 0,7112 1,0117 1,3345 -0,0087 -0,0058 -0,0021 -0,8652 0,8838 1,6313 0,0689 1,0805 1,8064 -0,8712 -0,4668 0,114 -0,0043 0,0034 0,007
2013Q3 -0,6846 -0,3193 0,0702 0,7967 1,0676 1,4035 -0,0092 -0,0057 -0,0026 -0,824 0,5019 1,7184 -0,1275 1,1338 1,8844 -0,9011 -0,4617 0,1947 -0,0067 0,0024 0,0069
2013Q4 -0,6801 -0,296 0,1343 0,883 1,1022 1,3514 -0,0096 -0,0064 -0,0029 -1,1035 0,2969 1,6611 -0,2869 0,9266 1,9513 -0,9613 -0,336 0,314 -0,0077 -0,0021 0,0072
2014Q1 -0,6945 -0,2943 0,1571 0,9161 1,0944 1,3161 -0,0083 -0,0055 -0,0022 -0,8934 0,552 1,8425 -0,3357 0,9323 1,9962 -0,9931 -0,3788 0,3638 -0,0087 -0,0004 0,0065
2014Q2 -0,6257 -0,2207 0,2132 0,9147 1,0742 1,2238 -0,0077 -0,0045 -0,0017 -0,8521 0,4939 1,6307 -0,2094 0,9318 1,9119 -0,8882 -0,2691 0,3342 -0,0078 -0,0015 0,0054
2014Q3 -0,5211 -0,2187 0,1967 0,8733 0,9864 1,0935 -0,0067 -0,0037 -0,0007 -0,229 0,7778 1,9929 0,0376 0,9238 1,6998 -0,6788 -0,2361 0,241 -0,0064 -0,0012 0,0037
2014Q4 -0,5154 -0,1108 0,2777 0,8795 0,9758 1,0911 -0,0065 -0,0038 -0,0003 -0,2888 0,6597 1,8831 0,08 0,9584 1,6334 -0,6356 -0,2188 0,2 -0,0063 -0,0005 0,0029
2015Q1 -0,3674 -0,0266 0,3559 0,8268 0,9297 1,0225 -0,0054 -0,0032 0,0003 -0,1345 0,9546 2,1037 0,2657 0,8993 1,391 -0,4725 -0,2196 0,1002 -0,006 -0,0033 0,0007
2015Q2 -0,256 0,1272 0,509 0,7672 0,8639 0,9682 -0,0039 -0,0011 0,0019 0,1988 1,2932 2,5897 0,1604 0,758 1,2907 -0,3963 -0,0944 0,1465 -0,0067 -0,0038 -0,0004
2015Q3 -0,1322 0,2888 0,6385 0,7173 0,8346 0,9338 -0,003 -0,0002 0,0024 0,0814 1,3909 2,7596 0,1329 0,6276 1,166 -0,3566 -0,0784 0,174 -0,0072 -0,0049 -0,0012
2015Q4 0,007 0,4819 0,9057 0,6565 0,7929 0,8875 -0,0028 0 0,0028 -0,2865 1,0711 2,7776 -0,1207 0,4391 1,0067 -0,2758 -0,0226 0,2747 -0,0091 -0,0053 -0,0021
2016Q1 0,1184 0,7183 1,1206 0,5913 0,7163 0,8616 -0,0035 -0,0015 0,0024 -0,6162 0,9875 2,664 -0,2804 0,2347 0,9689 -0,2937 0,0605 0,4082 -0,0103 -0,0067 -0,0024
2016Q2 0,1966 1,2372 1,9009 0,3936 0,6155 0,8277 -0,0032 0,0004 0,0037 -1,6947 0,4496 2,4022 -0,4913 0,1449 0,8855 -0,3637 0,0075 0,4366 -0,0128 -0,0076 -0,003
2016Q3 0,3864 1,5442 2,7319 0,1384 0,5472 0,7939 -0,0026 0,0001 0,0055 -1,9237 0,0266 1,9983 -0,7853 0,0673 0,6564 -0,4076 0,0503 0,4498 -0,0151 -0,0081 -0,0041
2016Q4 0,3961 1,7918 3,2556 -0,0314 0,4273 0,8019 -0,0028 0,0011 0,0053 -1,934 -0,1417 1,7831 -0,8502 -0,0873 0,7169 -0,5597 -0,0343 0,4656 -0,0154 -0,0092 -0,0038
beta_hat_6beta_hat_0 beta_hat_1 beta_hat_2 beta_hat_3 beta_hat_4 beta_hat_5
Constant Lag Defense Burden Growth Rate Price Ratio Chinese Defense Burden Russian Defense Burden Trend
Sub-period
Lag Defense 
Burden
Growth Rate Price Ratio
Chines Defense 
Burden
Russian 
Defense Burden
Trend
2000-2007 0,574972 0,002504 1,065876 0,301048 0,052004 -0,001412
2007-2012 0,362725 -0,00019 -0,05907 0,15875 0,139455 0,004455
2012-2016 0,812095 -0,003105 0,536445 0,69347 -0,19724 -0,001355
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Most of the recent demand for defense spending studies focused on regional alliances 
such as NATO and Asian countries or some specific states like Canada, Egypt, and 
Turkey. This study contributed to the existing literature by estimating defense demand of 
a great power, the US, which has long been neglected, using Post-Cold War data.  
The US demand for defense spending is mainly determined by lagged defense burden, 
US economic growth, relative costliness of military goods, and Chinese defense burden 
whereas Russian defense burden sometimes shows significance with small coefficients up 
until 2012. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients behave differently in different time 
periods specifically (1) prior to the economic crises during 2000-2007, (2) during the 
economic crises between 2007 and 2012, and for the (3) post-economic crises during 
2012-2016. Notwithstanding, all coefficients except for the relative costliness of defense 
occurs at greater levels in the period of (3) compared to the period of (1). For example, a 
1% increase in last year’s defense burden causes around a 0.55% of this year’s military 
burden for the period prior to the economic crises on average whereas a 1% increase in 
defense burden causes an approximately 0.8% increase in today’s defense burden for the 
post crises period on average. Moreover, a 1 percentage point increase in growth rate 
correlates with a 0.3% increase and 0.4% decrease in military burden of the US on average 
for the periods prior to and after the economic crises, respectively. 
The present study is also able to capture the positive, negative, and insignificant effects 
of growth rate on military expenditure within different sub-periods of the time span of the 
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data. While the effect of growth rate on military burden of the US is positive before the 
crises, it is negative for the post-crises period. There also seems to be no significant 
correlation between the growth rate and defense burden during the economic crises period 
between 2007 and 2012. This leads to the conclusion that not only states that differ in 
development stages or geographies can display conflicting results with regard to the 
growth-milex nexus, but even one sole state may display different behaviors within 
specific time frames that owns particular political and economic specifications. This 
consequently suggests that growth effect on demand for defense is not a static one and 
cannot be absolutely determined. 
While pointing out the determinants of the US demand for defense spending, the 
present study also served to confirm some theoretical information in defense economics 
area. An important contribution of the present study is towards capturing the effect of 
relative price of military goods on military expenditures, which exist in the original 
neoclassical framework of Smith (1989) but omitted by previous studies due to data 
unavailability. Both volatility and sign change of the correlation coefficient well coincide 
with political and military events that the US had involved in such as 2007 economic crises 
and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the US defense burden is found to be in a 
significantly positive correlation generally, the coefficient shows drastic rises and falls in 
times of high of military activity and low military activity, respectively.  
Along with internal factors that could affect the US demand for defense burden, 
Russian and Chinese defense burdens are also included in the model as external factors. 
The positive and gradually increasing pattern of the coefficient for Chinese defense burden 
suggests that the US sees China as a competitor in the global arena as Chinese aggregate 
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military expenditure is expected to catch its US counterpart within next 30 years. Also, 
the sharp rise of the coefficient after 2012 seems to match well with the new re-balance to 
Asia-Pacific policy of the US, which demands broader military presence and deepened 
military relations with the allies in the region. Oppositely, after a two decade increase, the 
coefficient for Russia shows a drastic decline and becomes insignificant in 2012. This, in 
turn, suggests that Russia might not be considered as an important threat by the US 
anymore, which is consistent with its new foreign policy where China and Asia-Pacific 
region is at the center. This confirms that that the military policy of the States adjusts in a 
very dynamic way and walks hand in hand with its foreign political policy.  
Another contribution of this study is presenting a novel method, called ME-boot rolling 
window estimate, which offers more robust interval estimates for relatively small sample 
sizes and allows the parameters to evolve over time. Both the OLS and Me-boot results 
were presented in Graph 5.1 through 5.6 for comparison. One can consider very sharp rise 
and falls of the coefficients and instantly narrowed confidence intervals as problematic in 
the OLS results, compared to the smoother and more consistent results developed by Me-
boot rolling windows estimates. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Defense burdens of NATO and pacific allies of the US as possible explanatory 
variables are omitted for a couple of reasons. First, it has been shown that many countries 
are the follower or a free rider of the US in an alliance (Smith 1980) (Dunne, Pashardes, 
& Smith 1984) (Smith 1989) (Solomon, 2005) (Nikolaidou 2008) (Fu, Lin & Lin 2013) 
(Solomon 2014) (Christie 2017) (Spangler 2017) assuming that the US acts as a 
Stackelberg leader (Bruce 1990) (Markowski et. al 2017). Both cases of follower and free 
rider behavior imply a causal effect from the US to its ally, not the other way around. 
Second, defense spending of the US and its allies might also show multicollinearity due 
to their perception of Russia and China as ‘the common enemy’. More specifically, an 
increase in defense spending of the US and NATO could occur at the same time as a 
response to an increase in Russian defense spending and their correlation would not 
suggest a causal relationship. Third, considering the massive gap in defense spending of 
the US and its biggest allies around the world suggests that the US does not really rely on 
its allies when it comes to competition with other super powers like Russia and China. 
The defense spending of the US is more than double that of its biggest ally, NATO, which 
comprises 28 independent states when excluding the US and quintuple that of its five 
biggest pacific allies, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, and Philippines in total 
with 2015 US dollars according to SIPRI. Numbers combined with political events like 
Trump’s speeches of the ‘fair pay share’ among NATO states, allies’ dependence on the 
US is a more relevant and observable case than US reliance on its allies which again leads 
to the first point made. Four, offensive realism theory postulated in international relations 
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field by John Mearsheimer also supports the view of eliminating US regional allies from 
our model. According to the theory, the world system is anarchic and states are rational 
actors who seek world hegemony in every opportunity they catch without fully trusting to 
and relying on any other state. In other words with economics terminology, states always 
pursue dominant strategy with respect to others because they cannot know the real 
intention and motives of their opponents and even those of their allies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
 
